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Abstract
We develop a neoclassical trade model with heterogeneous factors of production. We consider
a world with two factors, labor and managers, each with a distribution of ability levels.
Production combines a manager of some type with a group of workers. The output of a unit
depends on the types of the two factors, with complementarity between them, while exhibiting
diminishing returns to the number of workers. We examine the sorting of factors to sectors and
the matching of factors within sectors, and we use the model to study the determinants of the
trade pattern and the e¤ects of trade on the wage and salary distributions. Finally, we extend
the model to include search frictions and consider the distribution of employment rates.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study how international trade a¤ects the sorting of heterogenous workers and
managers into industries and the matching of workers with managers in production units. It is
by now well known that rms in the same industry di¤er in size, in the compositions of their
workforces, in the technologies and capital goods they use, and in the wages they pay to their
workers. Industries di¤er in factor intensities and in the marginal contributions of worker and
managerial ability to rm productivity. Workers di¤er in physical attributes, in cognitive abilities,
and in their education, training, and experience. Although some studies of international trade have
examined the assignment of heterogeneous labor to di¤erent sectors and others have considered the
matching of workers to heterogeneous teammates or technologies, relatively little is known about
the general problem of how factors sort and match in the open economy when several of these
factors are di¤erentiated, when xed quantities of one impart decreasing returns to the others,
and when industries di¤er in their factor intensities and in the usefulness of factor quality.Our
paper addresses these more general, allocational issues and their implications for factor rewards.
Because workers and managers are heterogeneous, our analysis sheds light on the impact of trade on
the distribution of wages and managerial salaries, and thereby on the impact of trade on earnings
inequality.
By allowing for worker, manager, and industry heterogeneity, we can better understand a num-
ber of issues concerning the pattern and consequences of international trade. First, we can study
how countriesdistributions of di¤erentiated factors, in conjunction with their aggregate endow-
ments of these factors, determine their comparative advantage in the various sectors. Bombardini
et al. (2012) provide evidence, for example, that countriesskill dispersions have a quantitatively
similar impact on trade ows as do their aggregate endowments of human capital. Second, we can
investigate how trade inuences factor returns across the entire income distribution, a¤ecting more
than just the relative compensation paid to one factor versus another or to workers employed in one
industry versus another. These additional dimensions of inequality can be useful for understanding
recent ndings of substantial variation in wages that is not easily explained by observable worker
characteristics. Helpman et al. (2012) show, for example, that within-industry wage variation
accounts for a majority of wage inequality in Brazil even after controlling for workersoccupations.
Third, we can examine how globalization a¤ects the distribution of employment rates across skill
levels in a setting with search-and-matching frictions.
The literature on the sorting of workers to industries includes recent work by Costinot (2009),
Costinot and Vogel (2010), and Ohnsorge and Treer (2007), as well as earlier work by Mussa
(1982) and Ru¢ n (1988).1 All of these authors emphasize the comparative advantage that the
various types of labor have when employed in di¤erent industries. They study the determinants of
1We use the term sortingto refer to the allocation of heterogeneous factors to di¤erent industries and the term
matchingto refer to the combination of di¤erentiated factors within an industry.
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the trade pattern in countries that di¤er in the compositions of their labor forces and the impact
that trade has on income inequality across the skill or ability spectrum. But most assume a linear
relationship between labor input (of a given quality) and output or, what amounts to the same, an
absence of interactions between quantities of labor and quantities of other factors of production.
Models with one worker per rm or with a linear relationship between labor quantity and output
cannot speak to the determinants of a rms capital intensity or its managers span of control.
Thematching of workers to technologies within an industry is the focus of work by Yeaple (2005)
and Sampson (2012). These authors also assume a production function with constant returns to
labor and thus omit interactions between labor and any other factors of production.2 Similarly,
Grossman and Maggi (2000) study the pairing of workers who perform di¤erent production tasks,
but in a context with exactly two workers per rm and therefore no scope for variation in factor
intensity or rm size. The work of Antràs et al. (2006) does allow for endogenous span of control in
a model with matching of workers and managers, but theirs is a one-sector model with international
production teams and they assume a particular technology that tightly links the quality and the
quantity of labor that a given manager can oversee.
Our analysis extends a familiar trade model with two sectors, two factors, and perfectly-
competitive product markets. While most of our analysis assumes frictionless factor markets, we
also consider an economy with search and matching frictions. We call one factor laborand assume
throughout that workers are di¤erentiated along a single dimension that we term ability.Workers
with greater ability are assumed to be more productive in both industries, but the contribution of
ability to output may di¤er across uses. We refer to the second input as managers,although we
might alternatively think of them as machines.Similar to workers, managers generally di¤er in
ability (or machines di¤er in quality) and more able managers contribute more to output in both
sectors, albeit to an extent that may vary by industry. The modeling of an industrys technology
resembles that in Lucas (1978) and the extension provided by Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) to
allow for heterogeneity of both factors and decreasing returns to the quantity of one given the
quantity of the other. With this formulation, we can address how the economy matches a xed but
heterogenous supply of one input (managers or machines) with a xed but heterogeneous supply
of another (labor) in a setting where the relative number of workers per manager is a matter for
rms to decide.
In the next section, we lay out our basic model of an open economy with two countries, two
competitive industries, and two heterogeneous factors of production. Section 3 considers trade
between countries that have heterogeneous workers but homogeneous managers. Our analysis of
this simpler setting aids in understanding the more general case discussed in Sections 4, where
managers also are assumed to vary in ability. We show that, with homogeneous managers, the
sorting of workers is guided by a cross-industry comparison of the ratio of the elasticity of output
with respect to labor quality to the elasticity of output with respect to labor quantity. This can
2Both of these authors assume, however, that rms produce di¤erentiated products in a world of monopolistic
competition, so that inputs of additional labor by a rm do generate decreasing returns in terms of revenue. Thus,
these models do share some features with the ones that we study below.
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generate a simple sorting pattern in which all the best workers with ability above some threshold
level are employed in one sector and the remaining workers are employed in the other. But it also
can generate more complex patterns in which, for example, the most able and least able workers
sort to one sector while workers with intermediate levels of ability are allocated to the other. Trade
between countries with similar distributions of worker talent is determined by their aggregate
factor endowments as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model, whereas trade between countries with similar
relative endowments reveals a comparative advantage for a country with a superior distribution
of labor quality (as reected in a proportional rightward shift of its talent distribution) in the
good produced by the industry in which worker ability contributes more elastically to productivity.
With homogeneous managers, relative price movements do not a¤ect within-sector relative wages
and therefore have no e¤ect on wage inequality within industries. Across industries, the impact of
trade on wages reects a blend of Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner forces, as in models with
imperfect factor mobility such as Mussa (1982) and Grossman (1983).
In Section 4 we turn to the more interesting case that arises when both factors are heterogeneous
and there are complementarities between the qualities of the two factors. If the productivity of
a production unit is a strictly log supermodular function of the ability levels of the manager and
the workers, there is positive assortative matching of factors in each sector. That is, among the
sets of workers and managers that sort to a given sector, the better workers are matched with
the better managers. We provide su¢ cient conditions under which all of the workers with ability
above some threshold level and all the managers with ability above some (di¤erent) threshold level
sort to the same sector. We also provide conditions under which the high-ability workers sort to
the same sector as the low-ability managers. More complex sorting patterns are possible as well.
When countries share the same distributions of abilities and the sorting patterns do involve a single
threshold for each factor, then the country endowed with more managers per worker must export
the manager-intensive good.
When there are strong complementarities between the types of workers and managers, the e¤ects
of trade or trade liberalization on the wage distribution are subtle and interesting. An increase in
the relative price of some good might worsen the matches for all workers and improve the matches
for all managers, or vice versa. Alternatively, a change in relative price might improve the matches
for workers in one industry while worsening those for workers in the other. We identify conditions
for these various shifts in the matching functions and discuss their implications for factor rewards.
In particular, we identify situations in which trade causes within-industry income inequality to rise
or fall and we show that the impact of trade on an inputs within-sector earnings inequality can
di¤er from the changes that occur across sectors.
In Section 5, we extend the analysis to include economies with labor-market frictions by as-
suming that workers engage in directed search. In this setting, each potential worker seeks a job
at a rm of his choosing and manages to be hired by that rm with a probability that depends
on the number of applicants per vacancy. We show that, with these search frictions, wage and
employment rates both vary with ability; more able workers not only earn higher wages but also
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enjoy better job prospects. Moreover, we nd that trade a¤ects the inequality in expected wages
and in employment rates similarly.
Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Economic Environment
We examine a world economy comprising two countries, two industries, and two factors of pro-
duction. We call one of the factors laborand refer to individuals as workers.Each country is
endowed with a continuum of workers of various types. The exogenous supply of workers of type qL
in country c is LccL(qL) for c = fA;Bg, where Lc is the aggregate endowment of labor and cL (qL) is
the probability density function (pdf) over worker types. For ease of exposition, we assume through-
out that cL (qL) is continuous and strictly positive on a nite support S
c
L = [q
c
Lmin; q
c
Lmax]. We
refer to the second factor as managers,although we could as well have used the term machines.
Country c has a continuum of managers of measure Hc. We begin in Section 3 by assuming that all
managers (or machines) are alike, so that the set of manager types ScH has a single element. Subse-
quently, we introduce manager heterogeneity and then denote the supply of managers of type qH by
HccH(qH), with 
c
H(qH) continuous and strictly positive on a nite support S
c
H = [q
c
Hmin; q
c
Hmax].
3
Firms in the two countries have access to identical, constant-returns-to-scale technologies. The
output generated in an industry by a production unit comprising one manager and a group of
workers reects the number of workers that is combined with the manager and the types of the
employed factors. We could begin by specifying output as a function of the type of the manager
and a list of the types of all workers used in the production unit. However, in many models of a
managers span of control,such as Sattinger (1975), Garicano (2000), and Eeckhout and Kircher
(2012), rms have no incentive to combine a given manager with a group of workers of di¤erent
types.4 We build on the latter and, to conserve on notation, simply assume that each rm combines
a manager of some given type qH with a group of ` workers of a common type qL, thereby generating
output of
xi =  i (qH ; qL) `
i , 0 < i < 1. (1)
Here, i is a parameter that reects the diminishing returns to combining more workers with a given
manager and  i (qH ; qL) is a strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable, log supermodular
function that captures the complementarities between the types of the two factors.5 We assume that
3We focus on an environment where factor endowments are invariant to trade. This makes our results comparable
to most previous studies. Future work might consider adjustments in factor endowments - e.g., taking the terminology
of workers and managers literally one might study long-run skill acquisition that turns workers into managers. Or,
thinking of the second factor as machinery, one might incorporate investment in capital of di¤erent qualities.
4For example, the manager may be endowed with a unit of time that she must allocate among the various workers,
such that each workers productivity increases with the time devoted to him by the manager, albeit with diminishing
returns. The key assumption here is that there is no teamwork or synergy between workers in a rm; they interact
only insofar as they compete for the managers time. See Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) for further discussion. They
show, in such a setting, that it is optimal for every rm to combine a manager of some type with a group of workers
that share a common type.
5We adopt a Cobb-Douglas specication for factor quantities in order to simplify the analysis. Some of our results
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factor type contributes to productivity in qualitatively the same way in both sectors and, without
further loss of generality, order the types so that @ i=@qF > 0 for i = 1; 2 and F = H;L. With
this labeling convention, we can refer to qF as the abilityof factor F . Note that the industries
generally di¤er in the strength of the complementarities between factors, in the contributions of
factor abilities to productivity, and in their factor intensities.
The rest of the model is familiar from neoclassical trade theory. Consumers worldwide share
identical and homothetic preferences. Firms hire workers and managers on frictionless national
factor markets and engage in perfect competition on integrated world product markets. Countries
trade freely, with balanced trade. Note that we neglect for now the search frictions that are a
realistic and interesting feature of many markets with heterogeneous factors. We shall extend the
analysis to incorporate such frictions in Section 5 below.
3 Homogeneous Managers
We are ultimately interested in the sorting and matching of two heterogeneous factors of production.
However, before we get to that, we consider a simpler environment in which one of the factors
(managers) has a uniform type. By examining a setting with managers of similar ability, we can
gain insight into the sorting of the heterogeneous workers to industries without needing to concern
ourselves with the matching of managers and workers. We will introduce manager heterogeneity in
Section 4 below.
Suppose that all managers are identical and assume without further loss of generality that their
common ability level is qH = 1. Let ~ i(qL)   i (qL; 1) be the productivity in sector i of workers of
ability qL when combined with any manager who might be employed there. Output per manager
in sector i can now be written as xi = ~ i(qL)`
i , considering the diminishing returns to the number
of workers.
A key variable in the analysis will be the ratio of two elasticities that describe a sectors pro-
duction technology. One elasticity is "~ i(qL)  qL~ 
0
i(qL)=
~ (qL), which reects the responsiveness
of output to worker ability in sector i, holding constant the number of workers per manager. The
other elasticity is i, which is the responsiveness of output to labor quantity, holding constant the
ability of the workers. Let
sL(qL) 
"~ 1
(qL)
1
 
"~ 2
(qL)
2
be the di¤erence across sectors in these ratios. We assume for now that sL (qL) has a uniform sign
for all qL in the domain of the ability distribution and label the industries so that sL (qL) > 0.
More formally, we adopt for the time being the following assumption:
Assumption 1 SH = f1g and sL (qL) > 0 for all qL 2 SAL [ SBL .
would remain the same with an arbitrary constant-returns-to-scale production technology provided that there are no
factor intensity reversals.
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A rm in sector i chooses the number and type of its workers (per manager) to maximize
i (qL; `) = pi~ i (qL) `
i w (qL) ` r, where pi is the price of good i, w (qL) is the wage of a worker
with ability qL, and r is the salary of the representative manager.6 The rm can solve its prot
maximization problem in two stages. First, it calculates the optimal demand (per manager) for
workers of ability qL when the wage of such workers is w (qL), which yields
`i (qL) =
"
ipi
~ i (qL)
w (qL)
# 1
1 i
: (2)
Substituting this labor demand into the prot function gives an expression for prots that depends
only on the ability of the workers in the production unit, namely
~i (qL) = ip
1
1 i
i
~ i (qL)
1
1 i w (qL)
  i
1 i   r, (3)
where i  
i
1 i
i (1  i). In the second stage, the rm chooses qL to maximize ~i (qL). To
characterize this optimal choice, let QLi be the set of abilities of workers that sort into sector i
and let QintLi be the interior of this set. Since the equilibrium wage function must be everywhere
continuous, strictly increasing, and di¤erentiable at all points in QintLi , i = 1; 2, the rst-order
condition of the second-stage maximization problem implies
"~ i
(qL)
i
= "w (qL) for all qL 2 QintLi , (4)
where "w (qL) is the elasticity of the wage schedule with respect to ability.7
Evidently, rms in sector i choose their workers so that the elasticity of output with respect to
ability divided by the elasticity of output with respect to quantity is just equal to the elasticity of
the wage schedule.8 If (4) were to hold at just one value of qL 2 QLi, then all rms in industry
i would demand workers with the same ability level. Of course, such an outcome would not be
consistent with full employment of all types of workers. Instead, (4) must hold for all qL 2 QintLi . In
such circumstances, the rms in sector i are indi¤erent among the various types of workers that are
employed in the sector. This indi¤erence incorporates not only the heterogeneous productivities
of the di¤erent workers, but also the optimal adjustment in the number of workers that the rm
would make were it to switch from one type of worker to another. The accompanying adjustment
6We suppress for now the country superscript c, because we focus on rmsdecisions in a single country.
7The strict monotonicity of the wage function follows from the strict monotonicity of the productivity functions
~ i (qL); if wages were declining over some range of abilities, all rms would prefer to hire the most able workers in
this range. The continuity of the wage function follows from the continuity of the productivity function; if wages
were to jump at some q0L, rms would strictly prefer workers with ability a shade below q
0
L to workers with ability
a shade above q0L, because the former would be only slightly less productive but would cost discretely less. In the
appendix, we prove that the wage function must be di¤erentiable in the interior of QLi for the more general case
in which managers are heterogeneous; that proof applies as well to the case with homogeneous managers that we
consider in this section.
8Note that Costinot and Vogel (2010) derive a similar wage schedule, except that i = 1 for all i for their economy
with linear output.
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Figure 1: Wages of workers: homogeneous managers
in quantity explains why it is the ratio of the two elasticities and not just the responsiveness of
output to ability that rms take into account when they contemplate a change in the ability levels
of their employees.
The requirement that the wage function has an elasticity "~ i(qL)=i for all worker types that
are hired in sector i is equivalent to the requirement that the wage function takes the form
w (qL) = wi~ i (qL)
1=i for qL 2 QLi , (5)
for some (endogenous) wage anchor, wi. This wage function dictates the sorting pattern for labor.
Consider any worker type, say qL, that is hired in equilibrium by both sectors and is thus paid the
same wage in both. Under Assumption 1, workers with ability greater than qL can earn more in
sector 1 than in sector 2, because the wage that makes rms indi¤erent between these more able
workers and workers of ability qL is higher there. Similarly, workers with ability less than q

L face
better prospects in sector 2, because rms there are more willing to sacrice ability after taking
account of the optimal adjustment in quantity. It follows that the equilibrium sorting pattern has
a single cuto¤ level qL such that workers with ability above q

L are employed in sector 1 and those
with ability below qL are employed in sector 2.
Figure 1 shows the qualitative features of the equilibrium wage schedule. The solid curve
depicts what workers of di¤erent abilities actually are paid in equilibrium, considering that those
with ability qL  qL are employed in sector 1 and those with ability qL  qL are employed in
sector 2. The broken curves show what the wages for di¤erent types of workers would have to be
in order to make rms in an industry indi¤erent between hiring these types and hiring the types of
workers that actually are employed in the industry. From now on, we will refer to these wages that
reect what rms in the opposite sector would be willing to pay to replace their actual employees
with these alternative hires as the shadow wages.Notice that the shadow wages are less than the
equilibrium wages paid to workers in their actual sector of employment, as of course they must be.
7
Notice too that rms in either sector are willing to hire the workers with the marginal ability qL.
We record our observations about the equilibrium sorting pattern in
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, in any competitive equilibrium with em-
ployment in both sectors, the more able workers with qL  qL are employed in sector 1 and the less
able workers with qL  qL are employed in sector 2, for some qL 2 SL.
The intuition for this sorting pattern should be apparent by now. Sorting is determined by
comparing across sectors the ratios "~ i=i. On the one hand, when "~ i is large, there is a big
return to moving higher ability workers to sector i inasmuch as marginal ability contributes greatly
to productivity there. On the other hand, when i is large, output in sector i expands rapidly
with the number of employed workers, irrespective of their ability. In such circumstances, it makes
economic sense to deploy relatively large numbers of workers in the industry, and this can be
accomplished at lower cost by hiring the workers of lesser ability. The equilibrium sorting pattern
reects a trade-o¤ between the returns to ability and the returns to quantity.
We can now record the remaining equilibrium conditions by invoking labor-market clearing
for the various types of workers, imposing continuity of the wage function at qL, and adding a
requirement that all active rms must break even. We focus henceforth on equilibria characterized
by incomplete specialization, which arise whenever the endowment ratios and skill distribution are
not too extreme. Consider rst the aggregate supply and demand for workers with ability greater
than qL. Dene ei (qL) = ~ i (qL)
1=i `(qL) as the e¤ective labor hired per manager by a rm
that employs workers with ability qL. Such a rm produces [ei (qL)]
i units of good i for every
manager it employs. Using the expression for labor demand (2) and considering the wage schedule
(5), every rm operating in sector i combines the same amount of e¤ective labor with any one of its
managers, namely ei = (ipi=wi)
1=(1 i). It follows that the rms operating in sector i collectively
demand Hiei = Hi (ipi=wi)
1=(1 i) units of e¤ective labor, where Hi is the measure of managers
employed in sector i. The total supply of e¤ective labor is simply the measure of e¤ective units of
labor among those that sort to sector i. Equating demand and supply gives
Hi

ipi
wi
 1
1 i
= L
Z
qL2QLi
~ i(qL)
1=iL (qL) dqL, for i = 1; 2:
Proposition 1 tells us which workers are employed in which sectors, i.e., QL1 = [qL; qLmax] and
QL2 = [qLmin; q

L]. So we can write
H1

1p1
w1
 1
1 1
= L
Z qLmax
qL
~ 1(qL)
1=1L (qL) dqL (6)
and  
H  H1
2p2
w2
 1
1 2
= L
Z qL
qLmin
~ 2(qL)
1=2L (qL) dqL (7)
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where, in (7), we have used the market-clearing condition for managers, H1 +H2 = H.
The wage function must be continuous at qL, or else the rms that hire these workers in sector
1 could save discretely on labor costs by downgrading their workforce slightly, while sacricing only
a negligible quantity of output. Continuity of the wage schedule at qL implies that
w1~ 1(q

L)
1=1 = w2~ 2(q

L)
1=2 . (8)
Finally, prots must be equal to zero for rms operating in both sectors, assuming that the
economy is incompletely specialized (otherwise they are zero in the active sector and potentially
negative in the other). These requirements together with (3) pin down the equilibrium salary for
managers, r = ip
1
1 i
i
~ i (qL)
1
1 i w (qL)
  i
1 i , and also ensure that
1p
1
1 1
1 w
  1
1 1
1 = 2p
1
1 2
2 w
  2
1 2
2 . (9)
Equations (6)-(9) jointly determine the marginal worker qL, the wage anchors w1 and w2, and the
measure of managers H1 employed in sector 1 for any economy that produces positive amounts of
both goods. The equilibrium salary of managers is given by
r = ip
1
1 i
i w
  i
1 i
i ; i = 1; 2: (10)
In what follows, we are interested in the determinants of the trade pattern between countries
that di¤er in their relative endowments of labor to managers and in their distributions of worker
ability, and especially in how trade between such countries a¤ects their distributions of income.
3.1 Determinants of the Trade Pattern
Consider two countries that trade freely at common world prices but that di¤er in some way in
their factor supplies. Since consumers have identical and homothetic tastes worldwide, the trade
pattern between them can be identied by examining the countries relative outputs of the two
goods at common prices. Accordingly, we investigate how a change in parameters reecting factor
endowments a¤ects relative outputs of the two goods at given prices.
In each country, a rm in industry i employs ei = (ipi=wi)
1=(1 i) units of e¤ective labor per
manager, thereby producing eii units of good i. Thus, aggregate output in sector i is
Xi = Hi

ipi
wi
 i
1 i
; i = 1; 2: (11)
We can substitute the equal-prot condition (9) into this expression to eliminate the wage anchors.
9
Taking the ratio of the resulting expressions yields9
X1
X2
=
H1 
H  H1
 (1  2)p2
(1  1)p1
,
which implies that the relative output of good 1 is greater in whichever country allocates the greater
share of its managers to producing that good.
3.1.1 Relative Factor Endowments
First, suppose the two countries have the same distributions of worker ability but di¤er in their
relative aggregate endowments, H=L. To nd the pattern of trade, we totally di¤erentiate the
four-equation system comprising (6)-(9) with respect to H=L and examine how a change in relative
endowments a¤ects the allocation of managers to sector 1. The algebra in the appendix establishes
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that AL(qL) = 
B
L (qL) for qL 2 SAL = SBL .
Then country A exports the manager-intensive good if and only if HA=LA > HB=LB.
Proposition 2 represents, of course, an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. When worker
talent is distributed similarly in the two countries, the sorting of workers to sectors generates
no comparative advantages and so has no independent bearing on the trade pattern. Comparative
advantage is governed instead by relative quantities of the factors, just as in the case of homogeneous
labor. Of course, the heterogeneous workers do di¤er in their suitability for employment in the two
sectors, which means that supply elasticities will reect the di¤erence across sectors in the elasticity
ratio "~ i(qL)=i and so too will the volume of trade.
3.1.2 Distributions of Labor Ability
Now suppose that the relative number of managers and workers is the same in the two countries,
but that country A has relatively better workers in the sense that the pdf for worker ability in
country A is a rightward shift (RS) of the similar function in country B. That is,
BL (qL=) = 
A
L (qL) for all qL 2 SAL ; for some  > 1, (12)
which has the interpretation that every worker in country A is  times as productive as his coun-
terpart in the talent distribution in country B: Again, we need to totally di¤erentiate the system
of equations (6)-(9) in order to identify the impact of a rightward shift in the talent distribution on
employment of managers in sector 1. The algebra in the appendix supports the following conclusion.
9This condition can alternatively be derived from the observation that in sector i the fraction 1  i of revenue is
paid to managers, i.e., (1  i) piXi = rHi.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, that HA=LA = HB=LB, and that AL (qL) is a
rightward shift of BL (qL) for some  > 1. If "~ i(q
0
L) > "~ j
(q00L) for all q
0
L; q
00
L 2 SAL [ SBL , i 6= j,
i; j 2 f1; 2g, then country A exports good i.
The proposition states that the country that has the superior labor force exports the good
produced in the industry where worker ability contributes more elastically to productivity. Notice
that this need not be the good produced by the countrys most able workers inasmuch as sorting
reects the ranking of "~ 1(qL)=1 versus "~ 2(qL)=2, whereas the trade pattern depends only on
the ranking of "~ 1(qL) versus "~ 2(qL). This result can be understood by thinking about the sources
of comparative advantage in this setting. With HA=LA = HB=LB, the cross-sectoral di¤erence
in factor intensity is not a source of comparative advantage for either country. Meanwhile, with
"~ 1
(qL) di¤erent from "~ 2(qL), worker ability contributes di¤erently to productivity in the two sec-
tors. Country A, which is relatively better endowed with more able workers, enjoys a technological
comparative advantage in the industry in which ability matters more for output.10
3.2 The E¤ects of Trade on Income Distribution
We are especially interested in the relationship between trade and income distribution in a world
with heterogeneous factors of production. As in other neoclassical trade models, commodity prices
mediate the link between trade and earnings. The opening of trade (or subsequent trade liberal-
ization) generates an increase in the relative price of a countrys export good, which in turn alters
the demand for di¤erent factors and factor types. Accordingly, we examine the comparative static
response of the wage schedule and managerial salaries to a change in the relative price of the nal
goods.
Note rst that the wage function (5) pins down the relative wages of the various workers who
are employed in a given sector. A change in relative price can alter the relative pay only of workers
who are initially or ultimately employed in di¤erent industries . The calculations in the appendix
establish the following ndings.11
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then when p^1 > 0, (i) w^1 > w^2; (ii) if 1  2;
then w^1 > p^1 > r^ > 0 > w^2; (iii) if 1 > 2 and sL (q

L)  0; then w^1  w^2 > p^1 > 0 > r^; and (iv)
if 1 < 2 and sL (q

L)  0; then r^ > p^1 > 0 > w^1  w^2.
Part (i) of Proposition 4 says that any worker employed in industry 1 gains relative to any
worker employed in industry 2 when the relative price of good 1 rises. The remaining parts of the
proposition capture the two distinct inuences on factor returns in an economy with heterogeneous
10 In the special case in which ~ i (qL) is a power function for i = 1; 2, i.e., ~ i (qL) = aiq
i
L for some ai; i > 0,
"~ i(q
0
L) > "~ j (q
00
L) for all q
0
L and q
00
L if and only if i > j . Moreover, in this case, sL (qL) > 0 for all qL if and only if
1=1 > 2=2. Evidently, the conditions of Proposition 3 are easily satised. When ~ i (qL) is not a power function
for i = 1; 2, the requirement that "~ i(q
0
L) > "~ j (q
00
L) for all q
0
L; q
00
L 2 SAL [ SBL , i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2g is not trivial, but
it can be weakened into a comparison of the average elasticities of productivity with respect to ability in the two
sectors. See the proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix.
11 In what follows, we use a hatover a variable to indicate an incremental, proportional change; i.e., z^ = dz=z.
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labor. The cross-sectoral di¤erence in factor intensities introduces a force akin to that in the
standard Heckscher-Ohlin model with homogeneous labor, whereby real wages tend to rise and real
managerial salaries tend to fall if the sector experiencing the increase in relative price is the more
labor intensive of the two. But the heterogeneity of labor implies that di¤erent workers are not
equally procient as potential employees in the two sectors, which introduces a force akin to that
in the Ricardo-Viner model (see, e.g., Jones, 1971). Indeed, our result is reminiscent of ndings in
a model with imperfect factor mobility(Mussa, 1982) or partially mobile capital(Grossman,
1983). That is, if the factor intensity di¤erence across industries is large (i.e., 1 6= 2) and the force
for inter-industry sorting of the marginal worker types is muted (i.e., sL (qL)  0), then all types
of the factor used intensively in sector 1 must gain, while all types of the factor used intensively in
sector 2 must lose (parts (iii) and (iv) of the proposition). On the other hand, if the factor intensity
di¤erence is small (i.e., 1  2) and the di¤erent marginal worker types are imperfect substitutes
in the two sectors (sL (qL) > 0), then all workers initially employed in the expanding sector will
gain, all workers that continue to be employed in the contracting sector will lose, and the e¤ect on
the well being of managers will depend on their consumption pattern (part (ii) of the proposition).
In the former case, managerial salaries rise in terms of the import good but fall in terms of the
export good, as in the Ricardo-Viner model with mobile managers and sector-specic labor. In the
latter case, real managerial salaries rise if the export sector is manager intensive and fall if it is
labor intensive, as in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
In summary, when managers are homogeneous and thus matching is indeterminate, trade has
no e¤ect on within-industry wage inequality; the relative earnings of any pair of workers employed
in the same sector is pinned down by (5).12 Meanwhile, an increase in the price of good 1 raises
the wage anchor in sector 1 relative to the wage anchor in sector 2 (see part (i) of the proposition).
And since the higher-ability, higher-wage workers are employed in sector 1, this implies that by
raising wages in sector 1 relative to wages in sector 2 an increase in the price of good 1 increases
overall wage inequality in country A, while reducing wage inequality in country B. These results
provide a benchmark for comparing those in Section 4, where market forces determine the matching
of workers with heterogeneous managers and where trade can a¤ect income distribution by altering
the pattern of matches.
3.3 Sorting Reversals
So far, we have used Assumption 1 to characterize the sorting of heterogeneous workers and the
resulting trade structure. In this nal part of the section on homogeneous managers, we clarify
what can happen when sL (qL) switches sign.
First note that if ~ i (qL) is a power function for i = 1; 2, the function sL (qL) does not depend
on qL inasmuch as the elasticities of productivity with respect to ability then are constants. In such
12We should perhaps mention that, by altering the composition of workers in each sector, trade will a¤ect any
measure of within-industry wage inequality (such as, for example, the Gini coe¢ cient) that does not hold the set of
workers in the comparison xed.
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Figure 2: Wages with a reversal of sorting
circumstances, sL (qL) is either always positive or always negative, and we can assume sL (qL) > 0
without loss of generality, because this only amounts to a particular labeling of the sectors. However,
when ~ i (qL) is not a power function for some i, the assumption that sL (qL) has a uniform sign
for all qL 2 SL imposes meaningful restrictions on the forms of the productivity functions and the
support of the distribution of worker talent. Without these restrictions, we cannot be sure that the
most able workers sort into one sector and the least able workers sort into the other.
To illustrate what can happen when sL (qL) changes signs, suppose that the productivity of a
rm in sector i that hires workers of ability qL is given by
~ i (qL) =
 
iq
i
L + 1
1=i ; i > 0; i < 0 for i = 1; 2: (13)
This specication implies a constant elasticity of substitution between the ability of workers and
the ability of managers in generating the productivity of the rm, and that worker and managerial
ability are, in fact, complements. Of course, with homogeneous managers, rms have no possibility
to adjust manager type in order to take advantage of this complementarity. Nonetheless, the CES
specication for productivity represents a legitimate and even a plausible functional form.
When productivity takes the form indicated in (13), the elasticity of productivity with respect to
worker ability in sector i is given by "~ i (qL) = iq
i
L =
 
iq
i
L + 1

. If 1 6= 2 then "~ 1 (qL) "~ 2 (qL)
necessarily switches signs on qL 2 [0;+1) and therefore sL (qL) may switch signs on the support
of the distribution of worker ability, depending on the industry factor intensities and the range of
the talent distribution.
Figure 2 depicts an equilibrium wage schedule for an economy in which sL (qL) < 0 for low
values of qL and sL (qL) > 0 for high values of qL.13 In this economy, the most and least able
workers sort to sector 1 while a middle range of workers is hired into sector 2. The thin solid curves
in the gure depict the wages of workers employed in sector 1 as a function of their ability, while
13See Lim (2013) for the functional forms and parameter values that were used to generate this gure.
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the thick solid curve depicts the wages of workers employed in sector 2. The broken thin curve
depicts the shadow wage for workers in sector 2, i.e., the wage o¤ers they could garner were they to
seek jobs in sector 1. Similarly, the broken thick curve depicts the shadow wages available in sector
2 for workers actually employed in sector 1. Clearly, each worker sorts into the industry that o¤ers
him the highest wage.
Figure 2 represents an economy in which 1 = 2 = 0:5, i.e., the industries have similar factor
intensities. However, 1 6= 2, which generates the di¤erent elasticities of productivity at di¤erent
levels of ability. The comparative statics reveal an interesting response of wages to relative price
changes for these parameter values. Inasmuch as the factor intensities are common to the two
industries, there are no Stolper-Samuelson forces at work. But the workers that sort to sector 1 are
better suited for employment there than their counterparts working in sector 2. The forces akin to
those in a Ricardo-Viner model imply that when p1 rises, the real wages of all workers employed
in sector 1 also rise, while the real wages of all workers employed in sector 2 decline. In short, an
increase in the relative price of good 1 generates income gains for workers with high or low wages
but income losses for those in the middle of the wage distribution.14
When the two sectors di¤er in their factor intensities, the Stolper-Samuelson forces will again
play a role in determining the e¤ects of trade on the wage distribution. Take, for example, a case in
which 1 = 0:9 and 2 = 0:1, so that sector 1 is much more labor intensive than sector 2. We have
solved this example numerically for various sets of the other parameter values.15 In all such cases,
we found that an increase in the price of good 1 raises both wage anchors more than in proportion
to the price change, so that all workers gain in real income. Meanwhile, the salary of managers
falls. These results are familiar from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, and they are similar to what
we found with great disparities in factor intensities for economies that satisfy Assumption 1. We
nd as well that an increase in p1 benets workers employed in sector 1 more than those employed
in sector 2, in keeping with our observations that workers are partially specic to their industry
of employment due to comparative productivity di¤erences.16 Price changes do not a¤ect relative
wages for workers employed in the same industry, even if those workers are at opposite tails of the
talent distribution as is the case for some pairs of workers that sort to sector 1.
14For this example, we calculate that a 5% increase in p1 raises the wage anchor w1 by 5:7%, while depressing the
wage anchor w2 by 4:2%. Managerssalaries rise by 4:3%, which is proportionately less than the increase in price.
15As one example, we have solved the model for the case in which world prices are (p1; p2) = (1; 1) and the economy
has an aggregate endowment of
 
H; L

= (1; 1). In this example, we assumed that worker ability is drawn from a
truncated Pareto distribution on the support SL = [0:8; 1:8] with the shape parameter 3, and that the technological
parameters are given by (1; 1; 1) = (0:9; 0:7; 1) and (2; 2; 2) = (0:1; 0:3; 20). In the computed equilibrium,
sector 2 employs workers with qL 2 [1:034; 1:211] and 0:953 managers. The wage anchors are w1 = 0:718 and
w2 = 0:434 while the managers earn a salary of r = 0:765.
16Using the parameter values detailed in the previous footnote, we nd that a 5% increase in the price p1 generates
a wage hike of 5:6% for workers employed in sector 1, a wage hike of 5:4% for workers employed in sector 2, and a
slary reduction of 0:6% for all managers.
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4 Heterogeneous Managers
We now introduce manager heterogeneity and model the diversity of manager types similarly to
that for workers. More specically, we posit a mass Hc of managers in country c and a probability
density cH (qH) of managers with ability qH for qH 2 ScH = [qcHmin; qcHmax]. We take the supply of
managers and their ability distribution as given throughout the analysis.
To capture complementarities between workers and managers within a production unit, we
take the productivity functions  i (qH ; qL) for i = 1; 2 to be log supermodular; i.e., worker ability
contributes relatively more to productivity when the better workers are teamed with a more able
manager than when they are teamed with a less able manager. For convenience, we also assume that
 i (qH ; qL) is strictly increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable. In such circumstances, log
supermodularity of the productivity functions implies that  iH (qH ; qL) = i (qH ; qL) is increasing
in qL and  iL (qH ; qL) = i (qH ; qL) is increasing in qH , where  iF (qH ; qL) is the partial derivative
of  i (qH ; qL) with respect to qF , F = H;L. For the most part, we shall focus on the case where
 i (qH ; qL) is strictly log supermodular and then we will invoke
Assumption 2 (i) SH = [qHmin; qHmax], 0 < qHmin < qHmax < +1; (ii)  i (qH ; qL) is strictly
increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and strictly log supermodular for i = 1; 2.
However, we will also make occasional reference to the case of weak log supermodularity that arises
when the productivity functions are multiplicatively separable in their two arguments.17
We can proceed as before by treating the rms prot maximization problem in stages. First,
the rm takes as given the ability of its workers and of its manager and chooses the size of its
production team. This yields the labor demand per manager as a function of the employee types,
namely
` (qL; qH) =

ipi i (qH ; qL)
w (qL)
 1
1 i
.
Substituting this expression for labor demand into that for rm prots yields
~i (qH ; qL) = ip
1
1 i
i  i (qH ; qL)
1
1 i w (qL)
  i
1 i   r (qH) : (14)
Next, the rm identies the most suitable workers to combine with the manager, taking the con-
tinuous and strictly increasing wage schedule as given.18 This yields a prot function,
i (qH) = max
qL2SL
~i (qH ; qL) , (15)
for qH 2 SH ; i = 1; 2. Finally, the rm selects qH to maximize i (qH), given the continuous and
17 In particular, we shall refer to a case of Cobb-Douglas productivity,which arises when the productivity functions
are multiplicatively separable and have constant elasticities of productivity with respect to the ability of either factor.
In such circumstances, we can write  i (qH ; qL) = q
i
H q
i
L for some i > 0 and i > 0:
18The wage schedule must be continuous and strictly increasing for reasons analogous to those that apply with
homogeneous managers.
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strictly increasing salary schedule, r (qH). In an equilibrium, rms must be indi¤erent between
the various managers that are employed in an industry, or else all would hire a particular type (or
types) and some managers would be unemployed.
We show in the appendix that the solution to the rms prot-maximization problem and the
requirement that rms must be indi¤erent among the managers that sort to an industry together
generate equilibrium allocation sets QLi and QHi that are unions of closed intervals (where QFi
represents the set of types of factor F that sorts to industry i, for F = H;L and i = 1; 2). Moreover,
under Assumption 2, there must be positive assortative matching (PAM) of managers and workers
within each sector. In other words, among the managers and workers that sort to a sector, the
better workers are teamed with the better managers.19 However, as we shall see, PAM need not
apply economy-wide.
Let mi (qH) denote the solution to (15); i.e., mi (qH) is the common ability level of the workers
who would be teamed with a manager of ability qH if that manager happens to be employed in sector
i. The equilibrium matching function for the economy, m (qH), consists of m1 (qH) for qH 2 QH1
and m2 (qH) for qH 2 QH2. The matching function generates a pair of closed graphs
Mi = [fqH ; qLg j qL 2 mi (qH) for all qH 2 QHi] , i = 1; 2,
where Mi represents the production units that form in sector i in equilibrium. These graphs
comprise a union of connected sets Mni such that mi (qH) is continuous and strictly increasing in
each set but may jump discontinuously between them.
Consider an equilibrium with incomplete specialization, so that a positive measure of managers
sorts to each sector. All rms that are active in sector i earn zero prots, which implies
r (qH) = ip
1
1 i
i  i [qH ;mi (qH)]
1
1 i w [mi (qH)]
  i
1 i for all qH 2 QHi; i = 1; 2: (16)
Continuity of the wage and salary schedules implies that both functions are di¤erentiable almost
everywhere. Moreover, prot maximization and (16) imply that, at all interior points in a connected
subset Mni of Mi, the salary function r () and the wage function w () are di¤erentiable; see the
appendix for proof. It follows that the solution to (15) must satisfy the rst-order condition
m (qH) iL [qH ;m (qH)]
i i [qH ;m (qH)]
=
m (qH)w
0 [m (qH)]
w [m (qH)]
(17)
for all fqH ;m (qH)g 2Mn;inti ; n 2 Ni; i = 1; 2; where Mn;inti is the interior of the set Mni . Also,
19With strict log supermodularity of the productivitiy function  i (qH ; qL), PAM within sector i follows directly
from the arguments in Eeckhout and Kircher (2012). If  i (qH ; qL) is only weakly log supermodular, as in the case of
Cobb-Douglas productivity, there always exists an equilibrium with PAM in each industry, although the equilibrium
is not unique. Indeed, in this case, the matching of workers and managers in a sector is not well determined by
the model. Such indeterminacy reects that the relative productivity of a team of more able workers compared to
a team of less able workers is independent of the type of the manager. However, as we show in the appendix, the
indeterminacy of matching in the Cobb-Douglas case does not imply indeterminacy of allocation sets, output levels,
or factor prices; these outcomes in fact are unique.
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(16) and (17) imply that
qH iH [qH ;m (qH)]
(1  i) i [qH ;m (qH)]
=
qHr
0 (qH)
r (qH)
(18)
for all fqH ;m (qH)g 2Mn;inti ; n 2 Ni; i = 1; 2.
Notice that the left-hand side of (17) represents a ratio of elasticities, namely the elasticity
of productivity in sector i with respect to worker ability divided by the elasticity of output with
respect to labor quantity. Prot maximization requires that this ratio be equal to the elasticity of
the wage schedule. This is quite analogous to (4) for the case of homogeneous managers, except
that now the elasticity of productivity with respect to worker ability reects the matches that take
place in equilibrium and therefore the sorting of managers to sectors. Equation (18) is an analogous
condition that leaves rms indi¤erent among the managers hired in sector i; it equates the quotient
of the elasticity of productivity with respect to manager ability and the elasticity of output with
respect to the number of managers to the elasticity of the salary schedule.20
4.1 Sorting with Heterogeneous Managers
How do workers and managers sort to industries? Recall Figures 1 and 2 in Section 3 that show
equilibrium wage and shadow wage functions for the case of homogeneous managers. We argued
that the slope of the wage function must be greater just to the right of any boundary point between
connected sets of workers that sort to di¤erent industries than the slope of the shadow wage function
showing what the other industry would be willing to pay. An analogous condition applies when
managers are heterogeneous. Let qyL be the boundary between some sets of workers that sort to
di¤erent industries, so that workers with ability just above qyL sort to one sector and workers with
ability just below qyL sort to the other. In equilibrium, the wage function w (qL) must be at least
as steep to the right of qyL as it is to the left; otherwise the rms that employ workers with abilities
just above qyL could earn greater prots by slightly downgrading their workforce and those that
hire workers with abilities below qyL could earn earn greater prots by slightly upgrading theirs.
A similar argument applies for managers, which implies that the salary function r (qH) must be
(weakly) steeper just to the right of any boundary point qyH than just to the left of such a point.
Now that we have laid out the equilibrium conditions that guide matching and sorting, we
turn to the requirements for factor-market clearing. To this end, consider some connected set of
managers [qHa; qH ] that sorts to industry i and the set of workers [m (qHa) ;m (qH)] with whom
these managers are matched in equilibrium. A prot-maximizing rm in sector i that employs a
manager with ability qH and workers of ability qL demands ` (qH ; qL) = [ir (qH)] = [(1  i)w (qL)]
workers per manager. Since the matching function is everywhere increasing, it follows that
H
Z qH
qHa
ir (q)
(1  i)w [m (q)]
H (q) dq = L
Z m(qH)
m(qHa)
L [m (q)] dq ;
20The technologies exhibit constant returns to scale in the quantities of the two factors, so the elasticity of output
with respect to the number of managers in sector i is 1  i.
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where the left-hand side represents the total measure of workers demanded by rms operating in
sector i that hire managers with ability between qHa and qH and the right-hand side represents
the measure of workers available to be teamed with those managers. Since the left-hand side is
di¤erentiable in qH as long as qH is not a boundary point between managers that sort to di¤erent
industries, this equation implies that the matching function m (qH) also is di¤erentiable at such
points. That being the case, we can di¤erentiate the labor-market clearing condition with respect
to qH to derive a di¤erential equation for the matching function, namely
H
ir (qH)
(1  i)w [m (qH)]
H (qH) = LL [m (qH)]m
0 (qH) (19)
for fqH ;m (qH)g 2 Mn;inti , n 2 Ni, i = 1; 2. This equation says that the labor demanded by a
(small) set of managers with ability in [qH ; qH + dqH ] equals the density of workers in the economy
that match with these managers.
Equations (17), (18) and (19) comprise three di¤erential equations that are satised in any
competitive equilibrium by the wage schedule w (qL), the salary schedule r (qH), and the matching
function m (qH). Together with the zero-prot condition and a set of boundary conditions, these
equations can be used to characterize an equilibrium allocation.
Let us dene a threshold equilibrium as any equilibrium that can be characterized by a pair
of boundary points qL and q

H , such that all workers with ability less than q

L sort to some sector
while all workers with ability greater than qL sort to the other, and all managers with ability less
than qH sort to some sector while all managers with ability greater than q

H sort to the other. In
other words, in a threshold equilibrium (if one exists) the allocation sets QL1; QL2; QH1; and QH2
all consist of single connected intervals. We wish to identify conditions under which such a simple
sorting pattern emerges.
Consider rst the allocation of workers. The following proposition provides a su¢ cient condition
for the existence of an equilibrium in which all the most able workers sort to one sector and all the
least able workers sort to the other.
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that
 iL (qHmin; qL)
i i (qHmin; qL)
>
 jL (qHmax; qL)
j j (qHmax; qL)
for all qL 2 SL; i 6= j; i = 1; 2. Then, in any competitive equilibrium with employment of
workers in both sectors, the more able workers with qL  qL are employed in sector i and the less
able workers with qH  qH are employed in sector j, for some qL 2 SL.
The proposition states that all high-ability workers those with indexes above some threshold
will surely sort to sector i if the ratio of the elasticity of productivity with respect to worker ability
to the elasticity of output with respect to the number of workers is higher in that sector when a
given group of workers is teamed with the economys least able manager than the similar elasticity
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ratio that applies for sector j when the workers instead are teamed there with the economys most
able manager. In such circumstances, the combinations of workers and managers that emerge in
equilibrium cannot overturn the forces that we have previously identied that indicate sorting of
the best workers to sector i.21
An analogous condition applies to the allocation of managers, namely
Proposition 6 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds and that
 iH (qH ; qLmin)
(1  i) i (qH ; qLmin)
>
 jH (qH ; qLmax) 
1  j

 j (qH ; qLmax)
for all qH 2 SH ; i 6= j; i = 1; 2. Then, in any competitive equilibrium with employment of
managers in both sectors, the more able managers with qH  qH are employed in sector i and the
less able managers with qH  qH are employed in sector j, for some qH 2 SH .
Here, the inequality ensures that the ranking of sectors by the elasticity ratio relevant for managers
cannot be overturned even if we were to team a given manager with the economys most able
workers in sector j and with the economys least able workers in sector i.
If the inequality in Proposition 5 holds for some i and j and that in Proposition 6 holds for
some i0 and j0, then the allocations of the two factors generate a threshold equilibrium. Such an
equilibrium can take one of two forms. First, we might have i = i0 and j = j0, in which case the
most able workers and the most able managers will sort to the same sector. Alternatively, we might
have i = j0 and j = i0, in which case the most able workers sort to the same sector as the least
able managers, and vice versa. We refer to a sorting pattern that has the more able workers and
managers employed in the same sector as an HH=LL equilibrium (for high-highand low-low)
and one that has the more able workers employed in the same sector as the less able managers as
an HL=LH equilibrium (for high-lowand low-high).
It is easy to see that each of these types of equilibria can arise for certain productivity functions
and parameter values. To illustrate this point, let us consider the limiting case in which  1 ()
and  2 () are only weakly log supermodular and, in particular,  i (qH ; qL) = qiH qiL . In this
case of Cobb-Douglas productivity (see footnote 17), the elasticity of productivity with respect
to worker ability in sector i is a constant i and the elasticity of productivity with respect to
manager ability in sector i is a constant i. In such circumstances, the elasticity ratios do not
depend on the matches that form. Accordingly, an HH=LL equilibrium will arise if 1=1 > 2=2
21The strict log supermodularity of  i () implies that  iL (qH ; qL) = i (qH ; qL) is increasing in qH for every value
of qL. Therefore, if the inequality condition in the proposition holds, we must have
 iL (qH ; qL)
i i (qH ; qL)
>
 jL (q
0
H ; qL)
j j (q
0
H ; qL)
for all qL 2 SL and all qH ; q0H 2 SH ; i 6= j:
Then, the ratio of elasticities for a given worker is greater in sector i than in sector j regardless of the matches that
form in one sector or the other. In this case, the most able workers sort to the sector where the elasticity ratio is
unambiguously highest.
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and 1= (1  1) > 2= (1  2), whereas an HL=LH equilibrium will arise if 1=1 > 2=2 and
2= (1  2) > 1= (1  1). Indeed, in the Cobb-Douglas case wherein the forces guiding the
sorting of the two factors are of constant strength and independent of one another a threshold
equilibrium surely emerges. Qualitatively similar equilibria will exist for productivity functions
that are strictly log supermodular if the departure from Cobb-Douglas is relatively slight and the
ranges of ability levels for workers and managers are su¢ ciently small.
It is possible to provide a weaker su¢ cient condition for the existence of a threshold equilibrium
of the HH=LL variety. If the most able managers sort to sector 1, this can only strengthen the
incentives for the most able workers to sort there as well in the light of the complementarities
between factors implied by log supermodularity. Similarly, if the most able workers sort to sector
1, the most able managers will have greater incentive to do likewise than otherwise. This reasoning
motivates the following proposition, which we prove in the appendix.
Proposition 7 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. If
 1H (qH ; qL)
(1  1) 1 (qH ; qL)
>
 2H (qH ; qL)
(1  2) 2 (qH ; qL)
for all qH 2 SH ; qL 2 SL;
and
 1L (qH ; qL)
1 1 (qH ; qL)
>
 2L (qH ; qL)
2 2 (qH ; qL)
for all qH 2 SH ; qL 2 SL;
then in any competitive equilibrium with employment of managers and workers in both sectors,
the more able managers with qH  qH are employed in sector 1 and the less able managers with
qH  qH are employed in sector 2, for some qH 2 SH ; the more able workers with qL  qL are
employed in sector 1 and the less able workers with qH  qH are employed in sector 2, for some
qL 2 SL.
The di¤erence in the antecedents in Propositions 5 and 6 on the one hand and in Proposition
7 on the other is that, in the former we compare the elasticity ratio for each factor when it is
combined with the least able type of the other factor in one sector versus the most able type
in the other sector, whereas in the latter we compare the elasticity ratios for common partners
in the two sectors. The di¤erence arises, because an HH=LL equilibrium has PAM within and
across industries, whereas an HL=LH equilibrium has PAM only within industries. In an HL=LH
equilibrium, an able manager in sector i might be tempted to move to sector j despite a generally
greater responsiveness of productivity to ability in i, because the better workers have incentive to
sort to j, and with log supermodularity of  j (), the able manager stands to gain most from this
superior match. In contrast, in an HH=LL equilibrium, the able manager in sector i would nd
less able workers to match with were she to move to sector j, so the temptation to switch sectors
in order to upgrade partners is not present.
We have provided su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a threshold equilibrium in which the
allocation set for each factor and industry comprises a single, connected interval. These conditions
are not necessary, however, because the matches available to types that are quite di¤erent from the
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Figure 3: Matching: The most and least able workers and the most able mangers sort into sector 1
marginal type might not overturn their strong comparative advantage in one sector or the other.
Nonetheless, not all parameter congurations give rise to equilibria with such a simple sorting
pattern. An example of a more complex sorting pattern is illustrated in Figure 3.22 The gure
shows, for each worker type indicated along the horizontal axis, the sector in which that worker
is employed and the type of the manager with whom he is matched. In this example, the most
able and least able workers sort to sector 1 while an intermediate interval of worker types sort to
sector 2. The rms in sector 1 hire the economys most able managers whereas those in sector
2 hire those with ability below some threshold level. Notice that graphs M1 and M2 display the
general properties that we described above; they are unions of connected sets, with a matching
function m(qH) that is continuous and increasing within any such set. The gure reects a sorting
reversal for workers that arises because the elasticity ratio for labor is higher in sector 1 when
worker ability is low or high, but higher in sector 2 for a middle range of abilities. Of course, other
sorting patterns besides that depicted in Figure 3 also are possible.
Armed with an understanding of the forces that drive factor sorting, we will turn shortly to the
relationship between factor endowments and trade and the e¤ects of trade on the wage and salary
distributions. But before that, it will prove helpful to examine how matching and factor prices are
determined for some connected intervals of worker and manager types employed in a given sector.
4.2 Matching and Factor Prices Among a Group of Workers and Managers
Consider a subset of the factors employed and matched in some sector comprising the interval of
managers QH = [qHa; qHb] and the interval of workers QL = [qLa; qLb].23 Matching between these
groups and all wages and salaries must satisfy the di¤erential equations (17)-(19) for qH 2 QH
and qL = m (qH) 2 QL, along with the zero-prot condition (16) and the boundary conditions,
22The functional forms and parameter values underlying this example are presented in Lim (2013).
23We omit for now the subscripts that identify the sector of employment, because we will be examining only this
single group of workers and managers.
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qLa = m (qHa) and qLb = m (qHb). The solution to this system, which is unique, is described in the
appendix.
The solution has several notable properties. First, when the price of the good produced by these
factors increases by some proportion, all wages for workers in QL and all salaries for managers in
QH rise by this same proportion, while the matching between workers and managers remains as
before. Second, when the ratio of the number of managers in QH to the number of workers in QL
grows by some proportion ^, the wages of all workers in the group rise by the proportion (1  ) ^,
while the salaries of all managers in the group fall by the proportion ^. The change in relative
numbers also has no e¤ect on the matches that result.24
Now consider the e¤ects of changes in the boundary points of QH and QL. Lemma 2 in the
appendix establishes that, when (16)-(19) are satised for a given productivity function  () and
for given parameters p; ; H and L but with di¤erent boundary points, the corresponding matching
functions can intersect at most once. Moreover, if such an intersection exists, the solution with the
steeper matching function at the point of intersection also has lower wages and higher salaries for
all ability levels that are common to the two settings; see Lemma 6 in the appendix. A steeper
matching function means that managers are teamed with larger groups of workers, which implies
a higher marginal product of the managerial input and a small marginal product of labor input at
a given ability level for each factor.
Figure 4 illustrates how the matching function shifts when the uppermost boundary of the
interval of workers rises from qLb to qLb0 . Here, the matching functions that apply beforehand and
afterward must intersect at the common boundary point, (qHa; qLa). By Lemma 2, we know that
this can be the only intersection of the two curves, and then the fact that a manager with ability
qHb initially matches with a team of workers with ability qLb but ultimately matches with those
of ability qLb0 implies that the matching function shifts upward for all qH 2 (qHa; qHb], as shown.
24See Lemma 1 in the appendix for a formal statement and proof of these results.
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Finally, Lemma 6 implies that wages decline for all types in QL when additional workers are added
to the upper end of the interval.
The re-matching depicted in Figure 4 has implications for within-group wage and salary inequal-
ity. Consider the wage distribution among workers in QL. The di¤erential equation (17) implies
that
lnwi (qLc)  lnwi (qLc0) =
Z qLc0
qLc
 iL [ (x) ; x]
i i [ (x) ; x]
dx; for all qLc;qLc0 2 QL ; (20)
where  () is the inverse of m ().25 Therefore, if all workers with ability levels between qLc and
qLc0 are re-matched with managers that are less able than the ones they teamed with initially, the
wage of the more able worker of type qLc0 will decline relative to that of the less able worker of
type qLc. The downgrading of managers is detrimental to both of these workers, but especially so
to the one with greater ability due to the complementarities between factor types. It follows that a
re-matching of a group of workers with less able managers generates a narrowing of wage inequality
within the group. By a similar argument (and using the di¤erential equation (18) for salaries), the
re-matching depicted in Figure 4 generates a spread in the salary distribution for managers in QH
inasmuch as these managers all see their matches improve.26
Similar reasoning can be used to nd the shift in the matching function and the wage and
salary responses for changes in the other boundary points. For example, if the lower boundary of
the interval of managers rises from qHa to qHa0 , the matching function shifts downward (thereby
connecting a point to the right of a in Figure 4 with point b), and thus the manager types that
remain in the sector nd that their matches deteriorate while all workers in QL match with better
managers than before. Such a re-matching narrows the salary distribution while exacerbating wage
inequality. In short, whenever the matches improve for a group of workers or managers working in
some sector, the more able among them benet the most and within-group inequality grows.
We are ready now to address the sources of comparative advantage and the impact of trade on
wages and salaries.
4.3 Comparative Advantage
Consider two countries that have similar distributions of factor types but di¤er in their relative
factor endowments. Suppose that a threshold equilibrium prevails in each country. Finally, suppose
that the industries di¤er in their factor intensities. How do the relative output levels compare in
the two countries?
Let us begin with the case of an HL=LH equilibrium in which the most able workers and least
able managers are employed in sector 1. The solid lines in Figure 5 depict the qualitative features
of the inverse matching function for country A in such circumstances. Notice that the equilibrium
features PAM within sectors, but not across sectors, as we have previously described. Now compare
25 If  i () is strictly log supermodular, then m () is strictly increasing, and therefore must be invertible. If  i () is
only weakly log supermodular, we focus on the equilibrium with PAM (that surely exists), and then once again m ()
is invertible.
26Sampson (2012) derives a related result.
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Figure 5: Sorting and matching: HL/LH equilibrium
country B, which we take to be the labor-abundant country; i.e., HA=LA > HB=LB. We prove in
the appendix that the labor-abundant country allocates greater shares of both its managers and
its workers to the labor-intensive industry. So, in country B, the worker threshold lies to the right
of qL and the manager threshold falls below q

H if and only if 2 > 1. In this case (depicted in the
gure), the inverse matching function for country B must begin at a point such as c0 (below c) and
extend to a point such as d0 (to the right of d). It cannot intersect cd twice (by Lemma 2 in the
appendix), which means that it cannot intersect that curve at all. Therefore, a manager type that
is employed in sector 2 in both countries achieves a match with more able workers in country B
than in country A. For those types of workers employed in sector 2 in both countries, the matches
with managers are better in country A. As for the matching among factors employed in sector 1,
the curve for country B must begin at a point such as a0 (to the right of a) and end at a point such
as b0 (below b). Here too the managers in country B are combined with more able workers than
their counterparts of similar ability in country A, whereas workers of similar type are combined
with less able managers in country B. Just the opposite is true about the relative positions of the
matching functions and the comparisons of the match qualities when sector 2 is the more manager
intensive; i.e., when 1 > 2. We prove in the appendix that, in either case, country A with its
relative abundance of managers always exports the manager-intensive good.
Now consider an HH=LL equilibrium in which the most able workers and the most able man-
agers sort to sector 1. The solid curve in Figure 6 depicts the inverse matching function for country
A. It is continuous, monotonically increasing (PAM in each sector and economy-wide), and has a
slope that rises at the threshold qL. We show in the appendix that, in this case too, the labor-
abundant country devotes a greater fraction of its managers and workers to the labor-intensive
industry. Thus, if industry 2 is labor intensive (2 > 1), the thresholds for country B must lie
to the right of qL and above q

H . The gure illustrates two di¤erent inverse matching functions
that have this property. As is clear, one broken curve lies everywhere below the inverse matching
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function for country A, whereas the other lies everywhere above the solid curve. Therefore, it is not
possible to say in general whether the workers or managers of a given ability level achieve better
matches in the labor-abundant or in the manager-abundant country. Nonetheless, the fact that
the labor-abundant country devotes a relatively greater share of its endowment of both factors to
production in the labor-intensive industry su¢ ces to ensure that this country produces relatively
more of the labor-intensive good. In short, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem extends to a setting with
heterogeneous factors so long as a threshold equilibrium prevails in both countries and the countries
share identical distributions of the factor types.27
Let us briey consider trade between two countries that have similar aggregate factor endow-
ments, similar distributions of manager types, but di¤erent distributions of heterogeneous workers.
Suppose that the distribution of worker ability in country A is a rightward shift of that in country
B; i.e., for each worker in country B, there is a counterpart in country A at the same place in
the talent distribution that has  > 1 times as much ability as measured by the index, qL. In the
appendix, we prove that, if  i (qH ; qL) = q
i
H q
i
L for i = 1; 2, then country A will have comparative
advantage in producing good 1 if and only if 1 > 2. That is, the country with better workers ex-
ports the good produced in the industry in which productivity responds more elastically to worker
ability. This result mirrors that for an economy with homogeneous managers, as reported in Propo-
sition 3. We have not managed to prove an analogous analytical result for an economy with strictly
log supermodular productivity functions. However, numerical simulations of the model some of
which are reported in Lim (2013) support a similar conclusion in such circumstances.
27Recall that, in the case with Cobb-Douglas productivity, a threshold equilibrium must prevail in both countries.
In the appendix we prove that, among countries with similar distributions of the two factors and Cobb-Douglas
productivity in each industry, the labor-abundant country produces relatively more of the labor-intensive good.
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4.4 The E¤ects of Trade on Wage and Salary Distributions
We turn now to the e¤ects of trade on wages and salaries. In Section 3, where we studied an economy
with homogeneous managers, we identied two considerations that color the link between output
prices and factor prices. First, when trade causes the relative price of a countrys export good to
rise, the expansion of the export sector tends to benet all types of the factor used intensively in
that sector and to harm the factor used intensively in the import-competing sector. Second, when
a factor is heterogeneous, trade tends to benets those types of the factor that have comparative
advantage in the export industry and to harm those types that have comparative advantage in the
import-competing industry. Of course, these two inuences on factor prices are familiar from the
Heckscher-Ohlin economy and the Ricardo-Viner economy, respectively.
In an economy with two heterogeneous factors and complementarities between their abilities
(or qualities), a new consideration comes into play. When productivity in each sector is a strictly
log supermodular function of the employeesability levels, the general equilibrium determines the
matching of workers and managers within production units. Then, as output prices change and
factors are re-allocated between sectors, the inows of some marginal types into the expanding
sector and the outows of these types from the contracting sector causes a re-matching of types
in each industry. This re-matching in turn a¤ects each types productivity and therefore the
equilibrium rates of pay. We will nd that re-matching introduces a mechanism by which trade
alters within-industry wage and salary distributions.28
For concreteness, consider a country that exports good 2. In Figure 7, the solid curves cd and
ab depict the countrys (inverse) matching function prior to the opening of trade for the case of an
HL=LH equilibrium in which the more able workers and less able managers sort to industry 1. To
understand the distributional implications of trade in such a country, we examine the e¤ects of an
increase in the relative price of good 2. This draws workers and managers into sector 2, so that
qH falls and q

L rises.
29 The new boundary points are represented by c0, d0, a0 and b0. As is evident
from the gure, the new inverse matching function (represented by the broken curves) lies below
the original function for all worker and manager types that remain in their original industry of
employment. As a result, the opening of trade allows all managers except those that switch sectors
to achieve better matches than before, while causing all workers except those that switch sectors
to realize worse matches than before.
Proposition 8 summarizes these e¤ects of trade on matching for the case of an HL=LH equi-
28We have also studied the e¤ects of trade on factor prices in an economy with Cobb-Douglas productivity and
report our ndings in the appendix. As we have noted, the matching of managers and workers is not well determined
in such an economy, since the relative productivity of two types of worker, for example, is not a¤ected by the ability
level of the manager with whom they might be matched. In such a setting, the rematching that results from trade is
not determined, but neither is it material for factor prices. We nd, with Cobb-Douglas productivity, that trade has
no e¤ect on within-industry wage or salary distribution, and the Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner inuences on
factor prices are analagous to those in an economy with homogeneous managers.
29Before any factor reallocation, the increase in p2 raises the value marginal product of the marginal workers and
managers in sector 2 relative to those in sector 1. As factors reallocate, marginal products change and rematching
occurs. But we show in the appendix that these secondary e¤ects cannot overturn the impact e¤ects, so that qH
must fall and qL must rises in the setting described by the gure.
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Figure 7: E¤ects of a rise in p2 on matching: HL=LH equilibrium
librium and reports the implications for wage and salary inequality.
Proposition 8 Suppose that: (i) Assumption 2 holds and (ii) the initial equilibrium is a threshold
equilibrium with an HL=LH sorting pattern. Then an increase in p2 (a) raises the labor cuto¤
qL and reduces the manager cuto¤ q

H so that more workers and more managers are employed in
sector 2; (b) worsens the matches for all workers except those that switch from sector 1 to sector 2;
(c) improves the matches for all managers except those that switch from sector 1 to sector 2; (d)
reduces within-industry wage inequality in both sectors and overall wage inequality in the economy;
and (e) increases within-industry salary inequality in both sectors and overall salary inequality.
Evidently, wage inequality falls among workers originally in industry 2 and among those remain-
ing in industry 1. Take for example any two workers qcL and q
c0
L such that qLmin  qcL < qc
0
L  qL.
Both workers see their match deteriorate as a result of the increase in the price of good 2, but
the re-matching harms the worker with ability qc
0
L by relatively more due to the complementarities
between factor types. This can be seen from (20), wherein the strict log supermodularity of  ()
implies that a downward shift in  () reduces the integrand on the right-hand side and thus reduces
the relative wage of the more able worker in the pair. The same is true for any pair of workers with
abilities between ~qL and qLmax. Finally, consider a pair of workers that switch sectors; i.e., those
that have ability levels between qL and ~q

L. The relative wage of the less able worker in this pair
must rise, because the elasticity of the wage schedule in (17) is determined after the price change
by the elasticity ratio in sector 2, whereas before it was determined by the elasticity ratio in sector
1. Since the more able workers sort to sector 1, it must be that the former elasticity is smaller
than the latter. It follows that wage inequality declines also among workers that switch sectors and
therefore among all workers in the economy; see Figure 8 for an example.
What is the overall e¤ect of the price change on the welfare of the various workers? There are
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Figure 8: E¤ects of a 5% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HL=LH equilibrium
several possibilities that can emerge, as can be seen in the numerical simulations presented by Lim
(2013). First, if sector 1 is labor intensive and the di¤erence in factor intensities across sectors
is large relative to the specicity of the heterogeneous factors, then the Stolper-Samuelson forces
dominate. In such circumstances, real wages decline for all workers while real salaries increase for
all managers. Of course, if sector 2 is the labor-intensive industry, then the opposite outcomes are
possible, with real gains for all workers and losses for all managers.
Figure 8 depicts the wage and salary responses for a less extreme case.30 Here, sector 2 is
labor intensive and p2 rises by 5%. All workers initially in sector 2 see their wages rise and those
at the bottom end of the ability distribution enjoy a wage hike in excess of 5%. Meanwhile, the
workers who remain in sector 1 su¤er a decline in wages despite the rise in the price of the labor-
intensive good. These workers su¤er from their comparative disadvantage in the expanding sector.
As for managers, those at the top end of the ability distribution gain the most and some see salary
improvements in excess of 5%. Those at the bottom of the ability distribution enjoy welfare gains
only if they devote little of their income to the export good. The gure shows the widening of
salary inequality among managers.
A host of other possible congurations can emerge, but all can be understood similarly with
reference to the relevant factor intensities and sector specicities; see Lim (2013) for examples.
Rather than dwell on these cases, we turn now to the wage and salary e¤ects of trade in an
30See Lim (2013) for the parameter values and functional forms that underlie this gure.
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Figure 9: Impact of a rise in p2 on matching: HH/LL equilibrium
HH=LL equilibrium. Recall the matching and sorting patterns for such an equilibrium that were
displayed in Figure 6. We show in the appendix that, when the price of good 2 rises in such a
setting, sector 2 expands by attracting both additional workers and additional managers. It follows
that both qL and q

H rise. In this case, the implications for matching vary according to whether
the movement of workers or the movement of managers dominates.
Figure 9 illustrates the various possibilities.31 The thick curve abc represents the initial inverse
matching function. Now suppose that qL rises only modestly, while q

H rises more dramatically.
32
Then the new equilibrium would be represented by an inverse matching function such as ab1c. In
the event, all workersmatches improve following the price hike, whereas all managers see their
matches deteriorate. Alternatively, the inow of workers to sector 2 can be large relative to that for
managers, in which case qL could expand greatly compared to the expansion in q

H . This possibility
is illustrated by the inverse matching function ab2c in the gure, and it implies a deterioration in
match quality for all workers and an improvement for all managers. Finally, the inverse matching
function ab3c depicts an intermediate case. Notice that the matches improve for all workers initially
in sector 2 but deteriorate for all those remaining in sector 1.
Let us focus on the case where the outcome is an inverse matching function such as ab1c to
discuss the implied wage and salary responses. Since workersmatches improve, wages rise faster
with ability than before. Since managersmatches deteriorate, the opposite is true of managerial
salaries. Notice that the inverse matching function has a steeper slope at point a in the new
equilibrium than before the price change. It follows from Lemma 6 that the wage of the least able
workers must rise. These workers benet directly from the increase in p2 and indirectly from the
improvement in their matches. The direct benet alone matches the proportional increase in price,
so these workers enjoy real income gains. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the most able
31Lim (2013) provides numerical examples of each along with the underlying parameter values.
32This outcome plausibly arises when sector 2 is considerably more manager intensive than sector 1.
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Figure 10: E¤ects of a 20% increase in p2 on wages and salaries in an HH=LL equilibrium
workers must lose. The change in p2 has no direct e¤ect on their value marginal product. Since the
new inverse matching function is atter at point c than the initial function, Lemma 6 implies that
these workers su¤er a decline in nominal wages. The gain in real income for the least able workers
and the loss for the most able workers represents a narrowing of wage inequality across sectors,
whereas the improved matching implies that wages are more unequal within each sector.
Figure 10 presents another example drawn from Lim (2013). Notice that the least able workers
enjoy real income gains, though not as large as for those more able than themselves who initially are
employed in the same sector. Meanwhile, the most able workers lose, but not as much as those less
able than themselves who remain in sector 1. The gure also shows the e¤ect on managerial salaries.
In this example, all managers realize income gains in terms of good 2 but losses in terms of good
1. These gains are smaller and the losses larger as we move up the salary distribution. A decline
in r (qHmin) =p2 is guaranteed in this case, because the direct e¤ect for the least able managers is a
salary increase proportional to the rise in p2, but the steepening of the inverse matching function
at a implies that their salaries must fall relative to the price of what they produce. The rise in
r (qHmax) =p1 also is guaranteed, because the inverse matching function is atter at point c than
before. Finally, we know that the new salary function is atter than the old both for managers
initially in sector 2 and for those that remain in sector 1, because the deterioration in match quality
hits especially hard for the more able managers in any sector.
If the inverse matching function instead is qualitatively like that depicted by ab2c in Figure 9,
30
then the outcomes are just the opposite. Low-ability managers gain from an increase in p2, because
their value marginal product rises in proportion to the price hike and rises further as a result of
the re-matching. High-ability managers lose in real terms, because r (qHmax) =p1 falls. All wages
rise, albeit less than in proportion to the price increase. The wage hikes are proportionally greatest
for those at the bottom end of the ability distribution. As a result of these factor price responses,
wage inequality declines both within and between sectors, whereas salaries become more unequal
within sectors, but those at the bottom who are employed in sector 2 gain relative to those at the
top who are employed in sector 1.
Finally, if the inverse matching function is like that depicted by ab3c, then the outcomes are a
mix of those described above. In this case, all workers initially employed in sector 2 must benet
from the price increase, while all managers initially employed in sector 1 must lose. The low-ability
managers and the high-ability workers both gain in compensation relative to the price of good 1,
but lose relative to the price of good 2. Lim (2013) provides numerical examples.
5 Labor Market Frictions
Until now, we have assumed that labor markets awlessly and costlessly allocate the various types of
labor to their most e¢ cient uses. Of course, the smooth functioning of labor markets is notoriously
suspect and worker heterogeneity would only seem to exacerbate the potential di¢ culties. In this
section, we show how a simple form of search frictions can be incorporated into the analysis. The
extension allows us to discuss the distribution of unemployment rates across the ability spectrum
alongside the distribution of wages.
To keep matters simple, we continue to assume a frictionless market for managers. In other
words, rms can hire managers of whatever ability and in whatever numbers they wish by o¤ering a
competitive salary.33 But rms must search for their workers and workers for jobs. We follow Peters
(1991, 2000), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Burdett et al. (2001), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010a,
2012), and others in modeling labor-market frictions with directed search,whereby rms post
costly vacancies that announce their compensation o¤ers and targeted workers and employee-
seeking rms meet randomly. In particular, we extend the approach of Eeckhout and Kircher that
allows for worker heterogeneity and multiple hires per rm to an environment with two industries.
Suppose, as before, that the output in industry i of a production unit comprising a manager of
ability qH and ` workers of ability qL is given by (1). A rm (or entrepreneurial manager) hires
workers by posting vacancies. Each posting costs ci units of the the rms nal output. A posting
lists the ability level qL that the rm targets and the wage ! that it will pay to any employee of
this type. We assume that the rm can commit to these job attributes, in the sense that it will not
hire workers with ability di¤erent from the posted level nor attempt to renegotiate its wage o¤er
33Perhaps the best way to justify this assumption is to imagine the manager as an entrepreneur, as in Lucas (1978).
Then it is the manager that searches for employees and her salary amounts to the residual prots after wages and
hiring costs are paid. Alternatively, one might think of the second factor as being capital, instead of managers, in
which case an assumption that rms can readily nd machines of the quality they desire is not so hard to swallow.
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after it meets with a job applicant.34 The rm chooses v, the number of its vacancies, to maximize
prots.
Workers are risk neutral. Each worker applies for a single job of his choosing.35 Workers
consider only the jobs for which they are qualied, because rms will not hire types di¤erent from
those targeted in their announcements. Among relevant jobs, each worker applies for the position
that o¤ers the greatest expected income. In equilibrium, workers must be indi¤erent among the
range of openings posted for their type.
Let s be the number of workers seeking jobs at a rm that has posted v vacancies. We assume
that the search process results in the consummation of M (s; v) jobs, where
M(s; v) = Bsv1  ; (21)
B > 0 and 0 <  < 1.36 For a rm, the probability of lling any given vacancy is v (s=v) =
B (s=v) , whereas for a worker the probability of a successful application is s (s=v) = B (s=v)
 (1 ).
The former is increasing in s=v, while the latter is decreasing in s=v; i.e., a rms chances of lling
a vacancy improve and a workers chances of landing a job decline with the number of applicants
per posting.
Now let w(qL) be the expected wage that workers of type qL obtain in equilibrium, which each
rm takes as given. A rm must o¤er at least this expected wage or it will nd itself without
applicants; and it has no reason to o¤er more. In equilibrium, a rm with v vacancies that o¤ers
a wage ! targeted to workers with ability qL attracts s applicants, where s is such as to make
the applicants indi¤erent between the rms openings and their other opportunities; i.e., s solves
s(s=v)! = w(qL). Using (21), this can be rewritten as
s
v
=

B!
w(qL)
 1
1 
: (22)
Equation (22) is the main building block in a model with directed search; it ties the wage an-
nouncement ! to the endogenous number of applications per vacancy s=v, which in turn determines
the rms ll rate, v(s=v):37 Given the expected wage w(qL), the rm can use (22) to compute
34Alternatively, we could allow a rm to post a wage schedule and to hire any worker it happens to meet at the
wage specied by the schedule. If each vacancy generates at most one meeting with a job applicant, then it is never
optimal for the rm to induce applications from more than one type of worker; see Eeckhout and Kircher (2010a,
2010b) for proof of this assertion in related environments. In such circumstances, there is no loss of generality in
assuming that the rm targets only one type of worker. Shimer (2005) studies a setting in which one vacancy can
result in multiple meetings with potential employees. Then, in the general, it is optimal for any rm to induce
applications from several di¤erent types. We do not explore this possibility here.
35This assumption is common in the literature on direct search. Galenianos and Kircher (2009) describe settings
in which the restriction to one application per worker does not change the qualitative predictions of the model.
36The job-search literature refers to M (s; v) as a matching function but we eschew that terminology so as to
avoid confusion with the function that matchesworkers and managers, qL = m (qH). The Cobb-Douglas form for
M () is common in the literature, and is implicitly coupled with the usual restriction that B is su¢ ciently small to
imply meeting probabilities below unity for both vacancies and workers.
37Peters (1991, 2000) and Burdett et al. (2001) provide microfoundations for a relationship similar to (22). They
begin by assuming a nite number of jobs and vacancies and then allow the economy to grow large without bound.
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the number of workers that will seek its employment and thus the number of workers ` =M (s; v)
that it will succeed in hiring. Again using (21), together with (22), we see that a rm that posts v
vacancies targeted at workers with ability qL and that o¤ers a wage of ! manages to hire ` workers,
where
` = B
1
1 

!
w(qL)
 
1 
v: (23)
Evidently, hires are proportional to the number of vacancies and rise with the ratio of the rms
wage o¤er to the workersoutside option.
Now consider the prot-maximization problem facing a rm with a manager of ability qH that
chooses to operate in industry i. The rm pays piciv to post v vacancies and pays ! to each of the
` workers that it eventually hires. Its prots are given by
i = pi i(qH ; qL)`
i   !`  piciv   r (qH) ;
where r (qH) as before represents the managers salary. Then, using (22) and the rst-order condi-
tion for the rms optimal choice of wage o¤er, we can re-express its prots as
i = pi'i(qH ; qL)s
i   w(qL)s  r (qH) ;
where
'i(qH ; qL)  [1  (1  ) i]

(1  ) i
ci
 (1 )i
1 (1 )i
B
i
1 (1 )i  i(qH ; qL)
1
1 (1 )i
and
0 < i 
i
1  (1  ) i
< 1:
Notice that this expression for prots has the same mathematical properties as the prot func-
tion i = pi i(qH ; qL)`
i  w(qL)`  r (qH) that we encountered in Section 4, because if  i(qH ; qL)
satises part (ii) of Assumption 3 (i.e., it is strictly increasing, continuously di¤erentiable, and
strictly log supermodular) so too does 'i(qH ; qL), and i like i is between zero and one.
38 In other
words, the rms choice about the number of job applications to invite in a setting with search
frictions is much like its choice about the number of workers to hire in a setting without them. The
rst-order condition for s implies
s =

ipi'i (qH ; qL)
w(qL)
 1
1 i
; (24)
This generates a ballsand-urns type function for applicants per vacancy, rather than the Cobb-Douglas form that is
more commonly assumed. Galenianos and Kircher (2012) extends their setup to generate CES and Cobb-Douglas
matching functions. With but a few exceptions, the literature on directed search species the matching function
individually for each vacancy, and we follow in this tradition.
38Note too that if  i(qH ; qL) is a product of power functions, so too is 'i(qH ; qL). And if  i(qH ; qL) has a constant
elasticity of substitution between qH and qL, so too does 'i(qH ; qL).
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which generates the prot function
i (qH ; qL) = ip
1
1 i
i 'i (qH ; qL)
1
1 i w (qL)
  i
1 i   r (qH) ,
where i  
i
1 i
i (1  i). This expression has much the same form as (14), which applies in the
absence of search frictions. Finally, the analog to the labor-market clearing condition from before is
the requirement that the aggregate number of applications induced by rms operating in industry
i and targeting workers of ability qL must equal the number of workers with that ability level that
sort to the sector in search of a job. With these observations, we conclude that the equilibrium
expected wage function w (qL), salary function r (qH) and matching function qL = m (qH) can be
characterized as the solution to three di¤erential equations analogous to (17)-(19), a zero prot
condition analogous to (16), and a set of boundary conditions. Evidently, comparative advantage
again derives from a countrys relative factor endowments and its distributions of worker and
manager ability. Moreover, since 1 > 2 if and only if 1 > 2, the cross-sectoral di¤erences in
factor intensities interact with di¤erences in factor endowments to determine the pattern of trade
in much the same way as before. The search frictions themselves are not an independent source of
comparative advantage so long as these frictions are similar in the two sectors.39
The model with search frictions features di¤erent employment rates across the range of ability
levels. In order to discuss the impact of trade on employment, we combine the optimal choice of
wage o¤er with a rms desired number of applications per manager to derive
! (qL) = B
 i

1  
pici
 (1 )i
w(qL)
1 (1 )i :
The expected wage w (qL) must be an increasing function of ability. It follows that, among
workers that seek employment in a given industry i, those with greater ability see higher posted
wages for the jobs they pursue. Next, we substitute this expression for ! (qL) into (23) to derive
an expression for the employment rate for workers of ability qL, namely
`
s
= B
i

1  
ci
(1 )i w(qL)
pi
(1 )i
: (25)
Since the expected wage on the right-hand side is an increasing function of ability, we conclude
that so too is the employment rate among workers seeking jobs in a given industry. We record our
ndings in
Proposition 9 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Let q0L; q
00
L 2 Qi, with q0L > q00L. Then the job
listings targeted to workers with ability q0L o¤er a higher expected wage and a greater probability of
employment than those targeted to q00L. The opening of trade causes the within-sector inequality of
expected wages and employment rates to move in the same direction.
39 If the number of meetings in (21) varies by sector, then it is immediate from the denition i   ii=(1  
(1   i) i) that the search process constitutes an additional source of comparative advantage.
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In a setting with search frictions, the opening of trade a¤ects di¤erently the employment rates
at di¤erent ability levels. Let us consider just one example to illustrate how the analysis can be
performed. Suppose a country has an HL=LH sorting pattern such as that depicted in Figure 5
and that the country exports good 2. The opening of trade generates an increase in p2. Figure
7 shows the e¤ects of such a price change on the matching of worker and manager types in each
sector. As we have seen, the workers who do not switch sectors nd themselves teamed with a less
able manager than before. Now, Figure 8 can be interpreted as illustrating the predicted impact
on expected wages. The gure shows an increase in w (qL) =p2 for some of the least able workers,
who sort to sector 2, a decline in w (qL) =p2 for some moderately able workers that sort to sector
2, and a decline in w (qL) =p1 for the most able workers, who sort to sector 1.
We refer now to equation (25), which applies in the presence of search frictions. The equation
implies that the employment rate rises for the aforementioned group of least able workers while
it falls for those with moderate and high ability. Overall, the distribution of employment rates
becomes more equal across the worker population. Of course, the e¤ects of trade on the distribution
of employment would be just the opposite if the country instead imported good 2. Evidently, trade
can widen or narrow the inequality in employment rates across the ability distribution according to
the sorting pattern that is realized and the comparative advantage of the country. The determinants
of these outcomes in an economy with directed search are similar to the determinants of wage
inequality in an economy that has frictionless labor markets.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have extended the familiar two-sector, two-factor model of international trade
to include heterogeneous factors of production. In a model with factor heterogeneity, we can
examine the determinants of factor sorting to industries and the determinants of factor matching
within industries. When the productivity of a production unit depends on both the managers and
workersabilities and particularly when there are strong complementarities between the two the
forces that guide sorting and matching become inextricably linked. The economy-wide pattern of
factor assignments can be subtle and complex even in the presence of strong complementarities
that dictate positive assortative matching within every sector.
A model with heterogeneous factors allows a more complete analysis of the distributional e¤ects
of trade than is possible in one with homogeneous factors. In particular, we can ask how the opening
of trade or trade liberalization a¤ects the wage and salary distributions over the entire range of
compensation levels. In general, there are three considerations that determine the e¤ects of trade
on the income of a particular individual. First, as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin world with
homogeneous factors, there is the question of whether the export sector is intensive in the use of
workers or managers. Second, as in the standard Ricardo-Viner world with factor specicity, there
is the question of whether an individuals type generates a personal comparative advantage in the
export sector or the import-competing sector. Finally, and most novel, there is the question of how
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trade a¤ects the individuals match with other factors of production. If a change in trade conditions
causes a worker to re-match with a better manager than before, then his productivity will improve
and his wage will receive an upward boost. If instead a workers match deteriorates, then his wage
may su¤er. Interestingly, the e¤ects of trade on wage or salary inequality across sectors may run
counter to the e¤ects on inequality within a sector.
We have shown that the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem extends to a setting with heterogeneous
factors provided that the countries share similar distributions of worker and managerial talent.
But we have also noted how di¤erences in the distributions of talent can be an independent source
of comparative advantage. A country that has more able workers than another in the sense of
a rightward shift in the talent distribution will produce relatively more of the good for which
productivity responds more elastically to ability.
Finally, we have incorporated search frictions. In a simple setting with directed search, rms
create vacancies and make wage o¤ers to workers of a targeted type. In such a setting, trade a¤ects
not only the distribution of wages but also the distribution of employment rates across the di¤erent
types of workers. We provide an example in which the main insights from the earlier analysis
carry over without modication to an environment with unemployment. But much work remains
to the elucidate the connection between trade and the e¢ ciency of matching and to understand
how globalization a¤ects equilibrium unemployment rates for di¤erent types of workers.
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Appendix for Matching and Sorting in a Global Economy
by
Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman, and Phillip Kircher
Appendix A
This appendix provides proofs of results stated in the main text.
Proofs for Section 3
First, note that in the system comprising (6)-(9), a proportional increase in the number of managers and
workers, H and L, raises H1 by the same factor of proportionality and leaves the marginal worker qL and
the wage anchors w1 and w2 unchanged. Therefore, the outputs of the two goods rise equiproportionately,
so that the ratio X1=X2 does not change. Accordingly, to nd the impact of H=L on X1=X2 it su¢ ces to
examine the e¤ects of a change in one factor, say L.
Di¤erentiating the equilibrium system (6)-(9), we obtain0BBBB@
1  1 sL (qL) 0
  11 1
2
1 2 0 0
0 E21 2
L~ 2 (q

L)
1=2 L (q

L) q

L E2H1=H2
E1
1 1 0  L~ 1 (q

L)
1=1 L (q

L) q

L  E1
1CCCCA
0BBB@
w^1
w^2
q^L
H^1
1CCCA =
0BBB@
0
0
 E2
 E1
1CCCA bL+
0BBBB@
0
  11 1
0
E1
1 1
1CCCCA p^1;
(26)
whereEi = Hi

ipi
wi
 1
1 i
; i = 1; 2; H2 = H  H1.
Let Dho be the determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side of (26). Then
Dho = LL (q

L) q

L
w (qL)
w1w2
H1
(2   1)2
(1  1)2 (1  2)2
+
sL (q

L)
(1  1) (1  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
1 + 2
H1
H2

E1E2;
because (8), (9) and the denition of Ei imply that
~ 1 (q

L)
1=1 E2
H1
H2
  ~ 2 (qL)1=2 E1 = H1
"
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1=1

2p2
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 1
1 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1p1
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#
=
w (qL)
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2   1
(1  1) (1  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: (27)
It follows that sL (qL) > 0) Dho > 0.
We now use (26) to calculate the response of H1 to an increase in labor supply L, which yields
H^1Dho =
1   2
(1  1) (1  2)
h
E1 L~ 2 (q

L)
1=2 L (q

L) q

L + E2 L
~ 1 (q

L)
1=1 L (q

L) q

L + E1E2sL (q

L)
i bL:
Therefore, given sL (qL) > 0, an increase in L raises the number of managers in sector 1 if and only if
1 > 2. When H1 increases, X1=X2 does so as well. It follows that the country with relatively more
workers produces relatively more of the labor-intensive good. This proves Proposition 2.
1
Next we calculate the response of the two wage anchors to changes in the price of good 1. From (26)
and (27), we obtain
w^1Dho = LL (q

L) q

L
1
1  1
w (qL)
w1w2
H1
1   2
(1  1) (1  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1) (1  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
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2
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p^1   sL (qL)
E1E2
1  1
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p^1:
It follows that sL (qL) > 0) (w^1   w^2) =p^1 > 0 , which implies that w^1 > w^2 when p^1 > 0, as stated in part
(i) of Proposition 4. We also calculate the response of the managerssalary, using (10) with i = 2: We nd
r^ =   2
1  2
w^2:
Evidently, the managerssalary moves in the opposite direction to the wage anchor in sector 2.
Now consider the cases discussed in parts (ii)-(iv) of Proposition 4. In case (ii) we have 1  2 and
therefore
w^1 
 11 +
H1
H2
1 + H1H2
p^1;
w^2   
(1  1) H1H2
1

1 + H1H2
 p^1;
r^ 
H1
H2
1 + H1H2
p^1:
It follows that w^1 > p^1 > r^ > 0 > w^2, which proves part (ii) of the proposition. In cases (iii) and (iv), we
have sL (qL)  0, which implies
w^1  w^2  1  2
1   2
p^1;
r^ =   2
1   2
p^1:
Therefore, if 1 > 2 then w^1  w^2 > p^1 > 0 > r^ and if 1 < 2 then r^ > p^1 > 0 > w^1  w^2, which proves
parts (iii) and (iv).
We now consider the impact of a rightward shift of the density function  (qL), as dened in (12). To
perform these comparative statics, we can equivalently hold the distribution of types constant but endow a
worker of type qL with qL units of ability. In each sector, the demand for e¢ ciency units of labor must equal
the supply. A worker in sector i of type qL provides ~ i (qL)
1=i units of e¢ ciency labor. The labor-market
clearing conditions should now be written as
H1
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2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2
A worker of type qL employed in sector i earns the salary
w (qL)= wi~ i (qL)
1=i ,
so wage continuity at the marginal worker qL requires
w1~ 1 (q

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1=2 . (30)
Finally, prots for a rm in industry i that hires workers with index qL are
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Equations (28) - (31) determine qL; H1, w1 and w2.
Now we dene QL= q

L and totally di¤erentiate the equilibrium system (evaluated at  = 1), which
yields
0BBBB@
1  1 sL (qL) 0
  11 1
2
1 2 0 0
0 E21 2
L~ 2 (q

L)
1=2 L (q

L) q

L E2H1=H2
E1
1 1 0  L~ 1 (q

L)
1=1 L (q

L) q

L  E1
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
w^1
w^2
Q^L
H^1
1CCCCA
=
0BBBBB@
0
0
 E22 "~ 2 (q

L)+
L~ 2 (q

L)
1=2 L (q

L) q

L
 E11 "~ 1 (q

L) L~ 1 (qL)1=1 L (qL) qL
1CCCCCA ^;
where "~ i
(qL) is a weighted average of the elasticities "~ i (qL) in sector i, with weights
vi (qL)=
~ i (qL)
1=i L (qL)R
qL2QLi
~ i (qL)
1=i L (qL) dqL
, i = 1; 2:
Therefore,
H^1Dho (1  1) (1  2)= E1E2sL (qL)
h
"~ 1 (q

L)  "~ 2 (q

L)
i
^
+LL (q

L) q

L
h
~ 1 (q

L)
1=1 E2+~ 2 (q

L)
1=2 E1
i h
"~ 1 (q

L)  "~ 2 (q

L)
i
^:
It follows that, given sL (qL)> 0, an increase in  raises H1 if and only if "~ 1 (q

L) > "~ 2
(qL). Moreover,
"~ 1
(qL)> "~ 2 (q

L) if "~ 1
(q0L) > "~ 2 (q
00
L) for all q
0
L; q
00
L2 SAL[SBL and "~ 1 (q

L) < "~ 2
(qL) if "~ 1 (q
0
L) <
3
"~ 2
(q00L) for all q
0
L; q
00
L 2 SAL [ SBL . This proves Proposition 3.
Proofs for Section 4
Denote by mi (qH) the solution set to problem (15). Because SL and SH are compact, mi (qH) is upper
hemicontinuous (because ~i (qL; qH) is a continuous function), and mi (qH) is closed-valued, the graph
Gi = [fqH ; qLg j qL 2 mi (qH) for all qH 2 SH ]
is closed. The matching correspondence satises
m (qH) =
(
m1 (qH) for qH 2 QH1
m2 (qH) for qH 2 QH2
and the equilibrium allocation graph in sector i is
Mi = [fqH ; qLg j qL 2 mi (qH) for all qH 2 QHi]  Gi:
Since QHi  SH , the graph Mi is also closed.
Now consider a connected subset Mni Mi:
Mni = [fqH ; qLg j qL 2 mi (qH) for all qH 2 [qH1; qH2]  QHi] :
Since Mi is a closed graph, such a subset exists and there exists an interval [qL1; qL2], qL2 > qL1, that
satises both (i) mi (qH) 2 [qL1; qL2] for all qH 2 [qH1; qH2] and (ii) for every point qL 2 [qL1; qL2] there
exists a managerial ability level qH 2 [qH1; qH2] satisfying qL 2 mi (qH). This means that, in Mni , workers
of ability [qL1; qL2] are matched with managers of ability [qH1; qH2] and all workers and managers have
matches. Then, as Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) have shown, strict log supermodularity of  i () ensures
strict positive assortative matching (PAM) between the factors allocated to sector i. It follows thatmi (qH) is
a continuous and strictly increasing function in the interior of [qH1; qH2]. Mi consists of a union of connected
sets, Mi = [n2NiMni , such that mi (qH) is continuous and strictly increasing in each such set and mi (qH)
jumps upwards between them.
We now establish the di¤erentiability of w () in Mn;inti .40 Let m 1 () be the inverse of the sectoral
matching function in Mn;inti . Since m () is continuous and strictly increasing in Mn;inti , this inverse exists.
Now consider an interval [q0L; q
0
L + dqL) 2Mn;inti . The zero-prot condition (16) implies
w (q0L) = 
1 i
i
i p
1
i
i  i

m 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L
 1
i r

m 1 (q0L)
  1 ii
and prot maximization implies
w (q0L + dqL)  
1 i
i
i p
1
i
i  i

m 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L + dqL
 1
i r

m 1 (q0L)
  1 ii :
40This proof is similar to the proof of di¤erentiability of the wage function in Sampson (2012).
4
Together, these expressions imply
w (q0L + dqL)  w (q0L)
(
 i

m 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L + dqL

 i [m
 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L]
) 1
i
: (32)
Similarly, (16) implies
w (q0L + dqL) = 
1 i
i
i p
1
i
i  i

m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L + dqL
 1
i r

m 1 (q0L + dqL)
  1 ii
and prot maximization implies
w (q0L)  
1 i
i
i p
1
i
i  i

m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L
 1
i r

m 1 (q0L + dqL)
  1 ii :
Together, these expressions imply
w (q0L)  w (q0L + dqL)
(
 i

m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L

 i [m
 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L + dqL]
) 1
i
: (33)
Inequalities (32) and (33) jointly imply
w (q0L)
 i [m
 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L]
1
i
24 i m 1 (q0L) ; q0L + dqL 1i    i m 1 (q0L) ; q0L 1i
dqL
35  w (q0L + dqL)  w (q0L)
dqL
 w (q
0
L)
 i [m
 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q
0
L]
1
i
24 i m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q0L + dqL 1i    i m 1 (q0L + dqL) ; q0L 1i
dqL
35 :
Since, by Assumption 3, the productivity function is continuous, strictly increasing, and di¤erentiable, and
since the inverse of the sectoral matching function is continuous and strictly increasing in this range, taking
the limit as dqL ! 0 implies that the derivative of w () at q0L exists and
dw (q0L)
dqL
=
w (q0L)
 i [m
 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L]
1
i
@ i

m 1 (q0L) ; q
0
L
 1
i
@qL
:
Similar arguments can be used to show that the salary function is di¤erentiable.
We now prove Proposition 6 by contradiction. (Proposition 5 can be proved similarly.) To this end,
suppose that the inequality condition holds, but the equilibrium is such that there are managers employed
in sector j who have greater ability than some managers employed in sector i. In such circumstances,
there exists an ability level ~qH at one of the boundaries between QHi and QHj such that managers with
ability in (~qH   "i; ~qH)QintHi are employed in sector i and managers with ability (~qH ; ~qH + "j) QintHj are
employed in sector j, for "i > 0 and "j > 0 small enough. Moreover, the equilibrium conditions (16)-(18) are
satised, the matching function m (qH) is continuous at QintHi and Q
int
Hj close to ~qH (but can be discontinuous
at the boundary point between these sets), the wage function w (qL) is continuous and increasing in SL
and di¤erentiable in QintLi and Q
int
Lj , and the salary function r (qH) is continuous and increasing in SH and
di¤erentiable in QintHi and Q
int
Hj .
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Now recall the continuous prot function i (qH) dened in (15). In equilibrium, i (qH) = 0 for all
qH 2 QHi, but the maximal prots i (qH) may di¤er from zero for qH =2 QHi. Therefore i (qH) = 0 for
all qH 2 (~qH   "i; ~qH) and, by continuity, limqH%~qH i (qH) = 0.
Next consider the prots that would accrue to an entrepreneur that hires a manager with ability ~qH + "
in order to produce good i, where " < "j . Choosing workers so as to maximize prots, this entrepre-
neur earns i (~qH + ")  i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

, where m
 
~q H

= lim"&0m (~qH   ") and lim"&0i (~qH + ") =
lim"&0 i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

= 0. The rst-order approximation to i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

is
i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H
  "iH ~qH + ";m  ~q H ;
where iH () is the partial derivative of i () with respect to qH . This derivative exists because the salary
function is di¤erentiable in QintHj , and
iH

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

= ip
1
1 i
i  i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H
 1
1 i w

m
 
~q H
  i1 i  iH ~qH + ";m  ~q H
(1  i) i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H
   r0 (~qH + ")
=
(
 i

~qH + ";m
 
~q H

 i

~qH ;m
 
~q H
 ) 11 i r  ~q H  iH ~qH + ";m  ~q H(1  i) i ~qH + ";m  ~q H   r0 (~qH + ") ;
where the last equality uses the free-entry condition (16), which applies to sector 1 at points in QintHi in the
conjectured equilibrium, and r
 
~q H

= r (~qH) due to the continuity of the salary function. Since ~qH+" 2 QintHj ,
condition (18) implies
lim
"&0
iH

~qH + ";mi
 
~q H

= r (~qH)
(
 iH

qH ;mi
 
~q H

(1  i) i

qH ;mi
 
~q H
    jH qH ;m  ~q+H 
1  j

 j

qH ;m
 
~q+H
) ;
where m
 
~q+H

= lim"&0m (~qH + "). It now follows from supposition of Proposition 6 that the right-hand
side of this equation is strictly positive irrespective of the values of mi
 
~q H

and m
 
~q+H

, and therefore that
iH

~qH + ";mi
 
~q H

> 0 for " small enough, which contradicts the zero-prot condition as prots rise above
zero This contradicts the supposition that in equilibrium there are managers employed in sector j who are
more able than some managers employed in sector i. Consequently, every manager in sector i has greater
ability than any manager employed in sector j. This completes the proof.
Next we prove Proposition 7. Suppose that the inequality conditions in Proposition 7 hold but the
equilibrium is such that there exist managers in sector 2 who are more able than some managers in sector 1.
In such circumstances, there exists an ability ~qH at one of the boundary points between QH1 and QH2 such
that managers of ability ~qH   "1 are employed in sector 1 and managers of ability ~qH + "2 are employed in
sector 2 for "1 > 0 and "2 > 0 small enough. Let m(~q
 
H) = limqH%~qH m(qH) and m(~q
+
H) = limqH&~qH m(qH)
Then
lim
"!0
iH

~qH + ";m(q
 
H)

= r (~qH)
"
 1H

~qH ;m(~q
 
H)

(1  1) 1

~qH ;m(~q
 
H)
    2H ~qH ;m  ~q+H
(1  2) 2

~qH ;m
 
~q+H
# ; (34)
which we derive in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 6. Under the supposition that the managers
to the left of ~qH sort into sector 1 and those to the right of ~qH sort into sector 2 the partial derivative in
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Figure 11: Matching function with discontinuity
(34) cannot be positive and therefore
 1H

~qH ;m(~q
 
H)

(1  1) 1

~qH ;m(~q
 
H)
   2H ~qH ;m  ~q+H
(1  2) 2

~qH ;m
 
~q+H
 :
In view of the rst inequality in Proposition 7 and the strict log supermodularity of the productivity function,
this inequality implies m
 
~q+H

> m
 
~q H

. That is, the matching function is discontinuous at ~qH and it jumps
upwards there. As a result, there must exist an ability level for workers qL 2

m
 
~q H

;m
 
~q+H

such that
workers in the range (qL   "1; qL) are employed in sector 1 and workers in the range (qL; qL + "2) are employed
in sector 2; for "1 and "2 small enough. Due to the upward jump of the matching function and due to PAM
in each sector, in this range of worker types the ability of managers matched with workers in sector 1 must be
strictly greater than the ability of managers matched with workers in sector 2. This is illustrated in Figure
11. At point A; we have qH = ~qH and the matching function exhibits an upward jump from point A to C.
The supposition is that managers to the left of A sort into sector 1 and managers to the right of A sort into
sector 2, as illustrated in the gure. Clearly, workers with ability between points A and C must be matched
with managers in some sector. Segment x illustrates a possible matching of these workers with high-ability
managers. It is not possible for x to be sector 2, however, because this would imply non-monotonic matching
in this sector, which is ruled out by the strict log supermodularity of the productivity function there. So
x must be sector 1. In this case, qL is the ability of workers at point C. Workers with ability just below
C are employed in sector 1 and workers with ability just above C are employed in sector 2. Evidently, the
ability of managers with whom these workers are matched in sector 1 is higher than the ability of managers
with whom their slightly better peers are matched in sector 2. It can be seen from the gure that a similar
outcome obtains if the matching along x is to the left of point A, except that in this case x stands for sector
2 and qL is the ability of workers at point A. Evidently, in this case too, at points around qL the ability of
managers matched with workers in sector 1 is higher than the ability of managers matched with workers in
sector 2.
In short, consider the inverse function m 11 (qL) for qL 2 (qL   "1; qL); this inverse exists in the specied
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range because m1 (qH) is continuous and strictly increasing at points in (~qH   "; ~qH) for " small enough.
Similarly, consider the inverse functionm 12 (qL) for qL 2 (qL; qL + "2); this inverse also exists in the specied
range because m2 (qH) is continuous and strictly increasing at points in (~qH ; ~qH + ") for " small enough.
Moreover, under the supposition of our sorting pattern m 1 (qL) = m 11 (qL) for qL 2 (qL   "1; qL) and
m 1 (qL) = m 12 (qL) for qL 2 (qL; qL + "2) and the argument in the previous paragraph showed that
m 1 (qL) = m 11 (qL) > m
 1 (q0L) = m
 1
2 (q
0
L) for qL 2 (qL   "1; qL) and q0L 2 (qL; qL + "2). Taking limits as
"1;"2 & 0, this implies that m 1
 
q L

> m 1
 
q+L

:
Next, following steps similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 6, which considered the response of
prots to variations in the ability of managers at points around ~qH , an analysis of the response of prots to
variations in the ability of workers at points around qL establishes that a necessary condition for optimality
is
 1L

m 1
 
q L

; qL

1 1

m 1
 
q L

; qL
   2L m 1  q+L  ; qL
2 2

m 1
 
q+L

; qL
 :
In view of the second inequality in Proposition 7 and the strict log supermodularity of the productivity
function, this inequality implies m 1
 
q+L

= m 12
 
q+L

> m 11
 
q L

= m 1
 
q L

, which contradicts the
above established result that m 11
 
q L

> m 12
 
q+L

. It follows that the best managers sort into sector 1.
By symmetrical arguments the best workers also sort into sector 1:
Matching and Factor Prices Among a Group of Workers and Managers
In order to prove the remaining propositions in the main text, we need to understand how matching
within an allocation set and the wages and salaries of workers and managers in the set respond to changes
in factor endowments, the price of the output produced by these factors, and the boundaries of workersand
managersabilities.
Suppose that some sector employs workers and managers whose abilities form the intervals SL = [qLa; qLb]
and SH = [qHa; qHb]. To simplify notation, we drop the sectoral index i and denote qH by q, and we consider
the following industry equilibrium conditions:
r (q) = p
1
1   [q;m (q)]
1
1  w [m (q)]
  1  ;  = 

1  (1  ) (35)
 L [q;m (q)]
 [q;m (q)]
=
w0 [m (q)]
w [m (q)]
; (36)
H
r (q)
(1  )w [m (q)]H (q) =
LL [m (q)]m
0 (q) ; (37)
and the boundary conditions,
m (qHz) = qLz, z = a; b; (38)
qLb > qLa > 0; qHb > qHa > 0:
Equation (35) is taken from (16), (36) is taken from (17) and (37) is taken from (19). We seek to characterize
the solution for the three functions, w (), r () and m ().
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We use (35) and (36) to obtain
ln r (qH)  ln r (qH0) =
Z qH
qH0
 H [x;m (x)]
(1  ) [x;m (x)]dx; for qH ; qH0 2 SH ; (39)
lnw (qL)  lnw (qL0) =
Z qL
qL0
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx; for qL; qL0 2 SL; (40)
where  () is the inverse of m (). We substitute (35) into (37) to obtain
1
1   lnw [m (q)] =
1
1   ln  + ln
 H
L

+
1
1   ln p (41)
+
1
1   ln [q;m (q)] + log H (q)  log L [m (q)]  logm
0 (q) :
The di¤erential equations (36) and (41) together with the boundary conditions (38) uniquely determine the
solution of w () and m () when the productivity function  () is twice continuously di¤erentiable and the
density functions F (), F = H;L, are continuously di¤erentiable.
By di¤erentiating (41) and substituting (36) into the result, we generate a second-order di¤erential
equation for the matching function,
m00 (q)
m0 (q)
=
 H [q;m (q)]
(1  ) L [q;m (q)]
   L [q;m (q)]m
0 (q)
 [q;m (q)]
+
0H (q)
H (q)
  
0
L [m (q)]m
0 (q)
L [m (q)]
: (42)
Given boundary conditions m (q0) = qL0, m0 (q0) = t0 > 0; this di¤erential equation has a unique solution,
which may or may not satisfy the boundary conditions (38). The solution to the original matching problem
is found by identifying a value ta such that m (qHa) = qLa and m0 (qHa) = ta yield a solution that satises
the second boundary condition m (qHb) = qLb. Note that this solution depends neither on the price p nor on
the factor endowments H and L. Therefore, changes in these variables do no a¤ect the matching function,
but they change all wages and salaries proportionately, as can be seen from (41), and (35). We have
Lemma 1 (i) The matching function m () does not depend on  p; H; L. (ii) An increase in the price p,
p^ > 0, raises the wage and salary schedules proportionately by p^. (iii) An increase in H=L such that H^  L^ =
^ > 0 raises the wage schedule proportionately by (1  ) ^ and reduces the salary schedule proportionately
by ^.
We now prove several lemmas that are used in the main analysis.
Lemma 2 Let [m{ (q) ; w{ (qL)] and [m% (q) ; w% (qL)] be solutions to the di¤erential equations (36) and
(41), each for di¤erent boundary conditions (38), such that m{ (q0) = m% (q0) = qL0 and m0% (q0) > m
0
{ (q0)
for q0 2 SH{ \ SH%. Then m% (q) > m{ (q) for all q > q0 and m% (q) < m{ (q) for all q < q0 in the
overlapping range of abilities.
Proof. Consider q > q0 and suppose that, contrary to the claim, there exists a q1 > q0 such that m% (q1) 
m{ (q1). Then di¤erentiability of m (),  = {; %, implies that there exists q2 > q0 such that m% (q2) =
m{ (q2), m% (q) > m{ (q) for all q 2 (q0; q2) and m0% (q2) < m0{ (q2). This also implies % (x) < { (x)
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for all x 2 (m% (q0) ;m% (q2)), where  () is the inverse of m (). Under these conditions (41) implies
w% [m% (q0)] < w{ [m% (q0)] and w% [m% (q2)] > w{ [m% (q2)], and therefore
w{ [m% (q2)]  w{ [m% (q0)] < w% [m% (q2)]  w% [m% (q0)] :
On the other hand, (40) implies
lnw [m% (q2)]  lnw [m% (q0)] =
Z m%(q2)
m%(q0)
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx;  = {; %:
Together with the previous inequality, this givesZ m%(q2)
m%(q0)
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx <
Z m%(q2)
m%(q0)
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
 dx:
Note, however, that strict log supermodularity of  () and % (x) < { (x) for all x 2 (m% (q0) ;m% (q2))
imply the reverse inequality, a contradiction. It follows that m% (q) > m{ (q) for all q > q0. A similar
argument shows that m% (q) < m{ (q) for all q < q0.
The key implication of this lemma is that changes in the boundary conditions (38) shift the matching
function in such a way as to generate at most one point in common with the original matching function. We
next show how the matching function and wage function respond to the boundary conditions. To this end,
re-consider Figure 4 in the main text. Let the thick curve between points a and b represent the solution
to the matching function when points a and b are the boundary points (38). Now consider the shift of the
equilibrium matching function in response to a rise in qLb; that is, the end point b shifts upward to b0. Since
point a is common to the old and new matching function, Lemma 2 implies that the two curves can have no
additional points in common, which implies that the new inverse matching function represented by the thin
curve between points a and b0 is everywhere above the old one. It follows that an increase in qLb increases
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the ability of workers matched with every manager except for the least able manager. Other shifts in the
boundary points can be analyzed in similar fashion to establish
Lemma 3 (i) dm (qH) =dqLa > 0 for all qH < qHb and d (qL) =dqLa < 0 for all qL < qLb; (ii) dm (qH) =dqLb >
0 for all qH > qHa and d (qL) =dqLb < 0 for all qL > qLa; (iii) d (qL) =dqHa > 0 for all qL < qLb and
dm (qH) =dqHa < 0 for all qH < qHb; and (iv) d (qL) =dqHb > 0 for all qL > qLa and dm (qH) =dqHb < 0 for
all qH > qHa.
The rule that emerges from this lemma is that an improvement in the ability of workers at a boundary
of SL improves the quality of the matches for all the managers (except those at the other boundary) and
deteriorates the quality of the matches for all the workers (except those at the other boundary). Similarly,
an improvement in the ability of managers at a boundary of SH improves the quality of the matches for all
workers (except those at the other boundary) and deteriorates the quality of the matches for all the managers
(except those at the other boundary).
Next consider changes in a boundary (qHz; qLz), z = a; b. For concreteness, suppose that (qHb; qLb)
changes. Then the new matching function coincides with the old one at the other boundary point, (qHa; qLa),
which has not changed. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that either the two matching functions coincide in
the overlapping range of abilities or one is above the other everywhere except for at (qHa; qLa). A similar
argument applies to changes in (qHa; qLa). We therefore have:
Lemma 4 In response to a shift in a single boundary (qHz; qLz), z = a; b, either the new matching functions
coincide with the old matching function in the overlapping range of abilities or one matching function is above
the other everywhere except for at the opposite boundary point.
We next discuss the impact of boundaries on wages and salaries. We focus on wages, but note that if
a shift in boundaries raises the wage of workers with ability qL then it must reduce the salary of managers
teamed with these workers. This can be seen from (35) by noting that a change in boundaries has no impact
on r () through an induced shift in the matching function due to the rst-order condition (36) (a version of
the Envelope Theorem). Therefore the change in salary r (q) is driven by the change in wages of workers
matched with managers of ability q. We record this result in
Lemma 5 Suppose that the boundaries (qHz; qLz), z = a; b, change and that, as a result, w (qL) rises
for some qL such that qL and q = m 1 (qL) are in the overlapping range of abilities of the old and new
boundaries. Then r (q) declines.
For the subsequent analysis the following lemma is useful:
Lemma 6 Let [m{ (q) ; w{ (qL)] and [m% (q) ; w% (qL)] be solutions to the di¤erential equations (36) and
(41), each for di¤erent boundary conditions (38), such that m{ (q0) = m% (q0) = qL0 and m0% (q0) > m
0
{ (q0)
for some q0 2 SL{ \ SL%, and let r% (q) and r{ (q) be the corresponding solutions to (35). Then w% (qL) <
w{ (qL) and r% (q) > r{ (q) in the overlapping range of abilities.
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Proof. From Lemma 2 we know that m% (q) > m{ (q) for all q > q0 and m% (q) < m{ (q) for all q < q0 in
the overlapping range of abilities and % (x) < { (x) for all x > qL0 and % (x) > { (x) for all x < qL0 in
the overlapping range of abilities. Moreover, m0% (q0) > m
0
{ (q0) and (41) imply
lnw{ (qL0) > lnw% (qL0)
while (40) implies
lnw (qL)  lnw (qL0) =
Z qL
qL0
 L [ (x) ; x]
 [ (x) ; x]
dx;  = {; %:
Together, these inequalities imply
lnw{ (qL)  lnw% (qL) >
Z qL
qL0
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx 
Z qL
qL0
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
dx
=
Z qL0
qL
 L

% (x) ; x

 

% (x) ; x
dx  Z qL0
qL
 L [{ (x) ; x]
 [{ (x) ; x]
dx:
For qL > qL0 the right-hand side of the rst line is positive due to the strict log supermodularity of the
productivity function and % (x) < { (x) for all x > qL0, and the second line also is positive for qL < qL0
due to the strict log supermodularity of the productivity function and % (x) > { (x) for all x < qL0. It
follows that w{ (qL) > w% (qL) for all qL in the overlapping range of abilities. A similar argument establishes
that r{ (q) < r% (q) for all q in the overlapping range of abilities.
This lemma, together with Lemma 4, have straightforward implications for the impact of boundary
points on the wage and salary functions.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the lower boundary (qHa; qLa) changes and the matching function shifts upwards
as a result. Then salaries decline and wages rise in the overlapping range of abilities. The converse holds
when the matching function shifts downwards.
Corollary 2 Suppose that the upper boundary (qHb; qLb) changes and the matching function shifts upwards
as a result. Then salaries rise and wages decline in the overlapping range of abilities. The converse holds
when the matching function shifts downwards.
Not only do wages and salaries shift in a predictable way in response to a shift in a boundary point,
the inequality of wages and of salaries also change in predictable ways. From (40) we see that a change in
boundaries that shifts upwards the matching function reduces wage inequality, because for every two ability
levels the ratio of the wage of a high-ability worker to the wage of a low-ability worker declines for all types
in the overlapping range. For salaries it is the opposite, as one can see from (39). We therefore have
Lemma 7 Suppose that the matching function shifts upwards in response to a shift in the boundaries (38).
Then wage inequality narrows and salary inequality widens. The opposite is true when the matching function
shifts downwards.
General Equilibrium
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Consider a two-sector economy in which the most-able workers are employed in one sector and the
least-able workers are employed in the other sector, and similarly for managers. In such circumstances,
the equilibrium can take one of two forms: either the highest-ability workers and highest-ability managers
are employed in the same sector and the lowest-ability workers and lowest-ability managers are employed
in the other, which we designated as an HH=LL equilibrium, or the highest-ability workers and lowest-
ability managers are employed in one sector and the lowest-ability workers and highest-ability managers are
employed in the other, which we designated as an HL=LH equilibrium. Our rst result is
Lemma 8 Suppose that the economy has a threshold equilibrium either of the HH=LL or HL=LH type.
Then: (i) if the best workers sort into the labor-intensive sector then an increase in H=L raises the cuto¤
qL and if the best workers sort into the manager-intensive sector then an increase in H=L reduces the cuto¤
qL; and (ii) if the best managers sort into the labor-intensive sector, then an increase in H=L raises the
cuto¤ qH and if the best managers sort into the manager-intensive sector then an increase in H=L reduces
the cuto¤ qH .
To prove this lemma, label the sectors so that the best workers sort into sector 1. We rst prove the
result for an HH=LL equilibrium and then for an HL=LH equilibrium.
HH=LL Equilibrium
In an HH=LL equilibrium the cuto¤s fqH ; qLg satisfy:
w1 (q

L) = w2 (q

L) ; (43)
r1 (q

H) = r2 (q

H) ; (44)
where [wi () ; ri () ;mi ()] is a solution to the single-sector di¤erential equations (36) and (41) for i = 1; 2
with the boundary conditions
m2 (qHmin) = qLmin; m2 (q

H) = q

L; (45)
m1 (q

H) = q

L; m1 (qHmax) = qLmax: (46)
Clearly, the solutions for the wage function, the salary function, and the matching functions depend on the
parameters of the model, such as prices and factor endowments, as do the equilibrium cuto¤s fqH ; qLg. We
denote by dwi (qL) =d# the derivative of the wage function in sector i with respect to a parameter #, where
this derivative accounts for the endogenous adjustments of all three functions. This derivative contrasts with
w0i (qL), which is the slope of the wage function for given parameters. We use similar notation to represent
derivatives of the salary function.
For now, we are interested in  = H=L and we shall use the following elasticities
"wi; =
dwi (qL)
d
 
H=L
  H=L
qL

qL=qL
; "ri; =
dri (qH)
d
 
H=L
  H=L
qH

qH=qH
:
Di¤erentiating (43)-(44) with respect to   H=L yields
w01 (q

L)
w1 (qL)
  w
0
2 (q

L)
w2 (qL)

dqL = "

w2;   "w1;; (47)
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
r01 (q

H)
r1 (qH)
  r
0
2 (q

H)
r2 (qH)

dqH = "

r2;   "r1;: (48)
The assumptions that the equilibrium is of the HH=LL type and that the best workers and managers sort
into sector 1 imply that the expressions in the square brackets are positive in both equations; that is, at the
boundary fqH ; qLg between the two sectors the slopes of the wage and salary functions have to be steeper
in sector 1 into which the more able employees sort. It follows that qL rises in response to an increase in the
ratio of managers to workers if and only if "w2; > "

w1; and the cuto¤ q

H rises if and only if "

r2; > "

r1;.
To understand the elasticities "wi; and "

ri;, note that a shift in
H=L impacts wages and salaries through
two channels. First, there is the direct e¤ect described in part (iii) of Lemma 1, which adds 1  i to "wi;
and  i to "ri;. This stems from the fact that, with constant boundaries, factor endowments do not a¤ect
the matching functions. But given factor intensity di¤erences across sectors, equations (47) and (48) imply
that with no changes in matching the right-hand side of each one of these equations equals 1   2, which
generate an increase in qL and q

H if and only if 1 2 > 0. These shifts in the cuto¤s trigger re-matching in
each sector, which impacts in turn the wage and salary functions, as implied by Lemmas 3-6 and Corollaries
1 and 2 to Lemma 6. In other words, the impact e¤ect of a rise in H=L increases the cuto¤s for both workers
and managers, but we also have to account for the induced change in matching in order to obtain the full
e¤ect. To this end, we now express the elasticities "wi; and "

ri; as follows:
"wi; = (1  i) ^ + "wiLq^L + "wiH q^H ; i = 1; 2; (49)
"ri; =  i^ + "riLq^L + "riH q^H ; i = 1; 2; (50)
where 1   i and  i represent the direct impacts of H=L, "wiL is the elasticity of wi () with respect to
the boundary qL through the induced re-matching (evaluated at q

L), and "

wiH
is the elasticity of wi () with
respect to the boundary qH through the induced re-matching (evaluated at q

L). From (35) and (36) we also
have
"riF =  
i
1  i
"wiF ; F = H;L; i = 1; 2: (51)
Now substitute these equations into (47) and (48) to obtain
M
HH=LL
h
 
q^L
q^H
!
=
 
1   2
1   2
!
^; (52)
where
M
HH=LL
h =
0BB@ q

L

w01(q

L)
w1(qL)
  w02(qL)
w2(qL)

+ "w1L   "w2L "w1H   "w2H
2"

w2L
1 2  
1"

w1L
1 1 q

H

r01(q

H)
r1(qH)
  r02(qH)
r2(qH)

+
2"

w2H
1 2  
1"

w1H
1 1
1CCA :
From Lemmas 3-6 we have
"w1L > 0; "

w2L < 0; "

w1H < 0; "

w2H > 0:
These equations provide a solution to q^L and q^

H .
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The determinant of the matrix MHH=LLh is
D
M
HH=LL
h
=

qL

w01 (q

L)
w1 (qL)
  w
0
2 (q

L)
w2 (qL)

+ "w1L   "w2L

qH

r01 (q

H)
r1 (qH)
  r
0
2 (q

H)
r2 (qH)

+

2"

w2H
1  2
  1"

w1H
1  1

qL

w01 (q

L)
w1 (qL)
  w
0
2 (q

L)
w2 (qL)

  1   2
(1  1) (1  2)
 
"w2H"

w1L   "w1H"w2L

:
The rst two terms on the right-hand side are positive. We now show that the third term also is positive. To
this end, note from Lemma 2 that if we change a single boundary and the new boundary is on the original
matching function then the new matching function coincides with the old one in the overlapping range of
abilities. Therefore, if we choose dqL = m
0
i (q

H) dq

H , where mi () is the solution of matching in sector i,
then a change in the boundary (dqH ; dq

L) does not change the wage wi (q

L). In other words,
"wiH + "

wiL"

mi = 0;
where "mi is the elasticity of mi () evaluated at qH . On the other hand, (37) implies for the HH=LL case
that
"mi =
mi
1  i
;
where
m =
Hr (qH)H (q

H) q

H
Lw (qL)L (q

L) q

L
:
Therefore,
"wiH =  
mi
1  i
"wiL:
Using this expression, we obtain
  1   2
(1  1) (1  2)
 
"w2H"

w1L   "w1H"w2L

=   (1   2)
2
m"

w1L
"w2L
(1  1)2 (1  2)2
> 0;
which proves that D
M
HH=LL
h
> 0.
Solving (52) implies that q^L > 0 and q^

H > 0 if and only if (1   2) ^ > 0. In other words, a rise in H=L
increases both cuto¤s if and only if sector 1 is labor intensive.
Next consider the e¤ects of price changes. An increase in the price of good i raises on impact wages and
salaries in sector i by p^i and has no direct impact on wages and salaries in the other sector. Following the
previous arguments, the change in the equilibrium cuto¤ points can be found as the solution to
M
HH=LL
h
 
q^L
q^H
!
=
 
p^2   p^1
p^2   p^1
!
; (53)
where the matrix MHH=LLh is the same as in (52). It follows from this system that q^

L > 0 and q^

H > 0 if and
only if p^2 > p^1. That is, an increase in the relative price of good 2 raises both cuto¤s and therefore raises
output in sector 2 and reduces that in sector 1.
HL=LH Equilibrium
In an HL=LH equilibrium, the cuto¤s fqH ; qLg also satisfy the continuity conditions (43) and (44), but
the boundary conditions are di¤erent. Assuming as before that the best workers sort into sector 1, this
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means that in an HL=LH equilibrium the best managers sort into sector 2 and the boundary conditions are
m1 (qHmin) = q

L; m1 (q

H) = qLmax;
m2 (q

H) = qLmin; m2 (qHmax) = q

L:
Figure 5 depicts the pattern of sorting and matching in this type of equilibrium. The more-able workers sort
into sector 1 only if
w01 (q

L)
w1 (qL)
>
w02 (q

L)
w2 (qL)
and the more-able managers sort into sector 2 only if
r01 (q

H)
r1 (qH)
<
r02 (q

H)
r2 (qH)
:
To derive the comparative statics, we use as before conditions (47) and (48), which apply in this case
too. We also can use the decomposition of elasticities (49) and (50), which still apply. Now, however, the
relationship between the elasticities of the salary and wage functions, as described by (51), does not apply,
because workers of ability qL do not pair with managers of ability q

H , as is evident from Figure 5. Instead,
from (35) and (36) we now obtain
"r1F =  
1
1  1
"maxw1F ; F = H;L;
"r2F =  
2
1  2
"minw2F ; F = H;L;
where "riF is dened in the same way as before, "
max
w1F
is the elasticity of w1 () with respect to the boundary
qF through the induced re-matching in sector 1 (evaluated at qLmax) and "
min
w2F
is the elasticity of w2 () with
respect to the boundary qF through the induced re-matching in sector 2 (evaluated at qLmin). Using these
results the systems of equations (52) and (53) are replaced by
M
HL=LH
h
 
q^L
q^H
!
=
 
1   2
1   2
!
^; (54)
and
M
HL=LH
h
 
q^L
q^H
!
=
 
p^2   p^1
p^2   p^1
!
; (55)
where
M
HL=LH
h =
0BB@ q

L

w01(q

L)
w1(qL)
  w02(qL)
w2(qL)

+ "w1L   "w2L "w1H   "w2H
2"
min
w2L
1 2  
1"
max
w1L
1 1 q

H

r01(q

H)
r1(qH)
  r02(qH)
r2(qH)

+
2"
min
w2H
1 2  
1"
max
w1H
1 1
1CCA : (56)
From Lemmas 3-6, we have "w1L > 0 > "

w2L
; "w1H > 0 > "

w2H
; "r1H < 0 < "

r2H
; "r1L < 0 < "

r2L
: This
implies that both entries in the top row in (56) are strictly positive and both entries in the bottom row are
strictly negative.
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Consider (55). The previous observations imply that a positive term p^2  p^1 either raises qL and reduces
qH ; or it reduces q

L and raises q

H : The cuto¤s cannot both move in the same direction, because the e¤ect
in the top row on the left hand side of (55) would then be opposite to those in the bottom row, whereas on
the right hand side both e¤ects have the same sign. We will show that only a rise in qL and a reduction
qH can be associated with equilibrium responses, which implies that the determinant of M
HL=LH
h must be
negative (D
M
HL=LH
h
< 0). To prove this, consider an increase in the price p2 to p02 > p2 while the price
p1 stays constant. Let X1 and X2 denote the output in each sector prior to the price change, and let
X 01 and X
0
2 denote the corresponding output after the price change. Since only prices have changed (and
not endowments), under each set of prices both the outputs (X1; X2) and (X 01; X
0
2) are feasible. Since the
competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient, the value of output is maximized given prices, which implies that
p1X1 + p2X2  p1X 01 + p2X 02;
p1X1 + p
0
2X2  p1X 01 + p02X 02;
where the rst inequality states that prior to the price change the value of output is higher under production
bundle (X1; X2) than under (X 01; X
0
2); while the opposite holds after the price change. Subtracting and
rearranging gives
(p2   p02)(X2  X 02)  0;
which implies that X2  X 02: An increase in output in sector two cannot be achieved with a fall in qL
and a rise qH , because in this case there would be less worker types and less manager types in sector 2.
Therefore, an increase in the relative price of good 2 leads to a rise in qL and a reduction q

H : This requires
D
M
HL=LH
h
< 0:
Now consider system (54). Since D
M
HL=LH
h
< 0; a rise in the relative endowment   H=L of managers
raises qL and reduces q

H : Finally, we must determine the e¤ect of a change in the relative endowment of
managers on relative outputs, which is a¤ected both by re-matching and the change in endowments. Sector
i pays managers a fraction 1  i of revenue. Therefore, in an HL=LH equilibrium, we have
(1  1) p1X1 = H
Z qH
qHmin
r (qH)H (qH) dqH ;
(1  2) p2X2 = H
Z qHmax
qH
r (qH)H (qH) dqH ;
which implies
(1  2) p2X2
(1  1) p1X1
=
R qHmax
qH
r (qH)H (qH) dqHR qH
qHmin
r (qH)H (qH) dqH
:
From (18) we obtain
ln ri (qH)  ln ri (qH0)=
Z qH
qH0
 iH [x;m (x)]
(1  i) i [x;m (x)]
dx; for all qH ; qH02 QHi:
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Substituting this equation into the previous one yields
X2
X1
=
(1  1) p1
R qHmax
qH
exp
hR qH
qH
 2H [q;m(q)]
(1 2) 2[q;m(q)]dq
i
H (qH) dqH
(1  2) p2
R qH
qHmin
exp
h
  R qH
qH
 1H [q;m(q)]
(1 1) 1[q;m(q)]dq
i
H (qH) dqH
; (57)
where we have used the property that r () is a continuous function. When sector 2 is manager intensive,
qH is lower in country A, which has more managers per worker. We have shown above that, in such
circumstances, managers of a given type are teamed with higher-ability workers in country A. Due to the
strict log supermodularity of the productivity functions this implies that  iH [q;m (q)] = i [q;m (q)] is higher
in country A in both sectors. It follows that the impact of a higher H=L on matching raises the relative
output of good 2. In the opposite case, when 1 < 2, the shift in matching reduces the relative output of
good 2. In short, the shift in matching raises the relative output of the manager-intensive good.
To complete the analysis of the impact of factor endowments on relative outputs, we need to assess the
direct impact of the cuto¤ qH on the relative outputs in (57). First note that q

H a¤ects relative outputs
through the boundaries of four integrals. When 1 > 2 and q

H declines in response to an increase in H=L,
the shifts in the boundaries of the outer integrals in the numerator and denominator raise the relative output
of good 2. In the opposite case, when 1 < 2 and q

H rises, the relative output of good 2 declines. A shift
in the boundaries of the two inner integrals in the numerator and denominator have opposite e¤ects from
one another. Consequently, we need to evaluate their relative strength. Di¤erentiation with respect to these
boundaries yields:
 X2
X1

lim
q&qH
 2H [q;m (q)]
(1  2) 2 [q;m (q)]
  lim
q%qH
 1H [q;m (q)]
(1  1) 1 [q;m (q)]

:
Since the best managers sort into sector 2, this requires the slope of the salary function r () to be steeper
at qH in sector 2, or, using (18), it requires the term in the curly bracket to be positive. It follows that a
decline in qH raises the relative output of good 2. If instead good 2 is labor intensive, q

H rises in response to
an increase in H=L, which raises the relative output of good 1. In either case, country A produces relatively
more of the manager-intensive good.
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we analyze the limiting case of Cobb-Douglas productivity; that is
 i (qH ; qL)= q
i
H q
i
L for i = 1; 2; i; i> 0: (58)
Note that, in this case, productivity is a weakly log supermodular function of the two ability levels. As such,
the complementarity between the talent of workers and that of the manager is somewhat muted compared
to what arises with strict log supermodularity, which means that the forces for positive assortative matching
within a sector are correspondingly weaker.
There is no need to go through all the steps of a rms prot maximization problem, because the
derivation proceeds much as for the case with homogeneous managers in Section 3. Su¢ ce it to say that
the demand per manager for workers of ability qL by a rm in industry i that pairs these workers with a
manager of ability qH is given by
` (qL; qH)=
"
ipiq
i
H q
i
L
w (qL)
# 1
1 i
. (59)
Substituting (59) into the expression for prots yields
~i (qL; qH)= ip
1
1 i
i

q
i
H q
i
L
 1
1 i w (qL)
  i
1 i  r (qH) , (60)
where r(qH) is the salary of a manager with ability qH and i 
i
1 i
i (1  i). Every rm chooses the
ability of its workers and the ability of its manager so as to maximize prots, yet free entry dictates that
these prots must be equal to zero in equilibrium. LetMi be the set of all matches that maximize prots in
sector i. For each pairing (qL; qH) in Mi,
r (qH)= ip
1
1 i
i

q
i
H q
i
L
 1
1 i w (qL)
  i
1 i , i = 1; 2; (61)
by dint of the zero-prot condition. Prot maximization with respect to the choice of types, evaluated for
pairings that achieve zero prots in accordance with (61), yields the rst-order conditions,
i
i
= "w(qL) for qL2 QintLi (62)
and
i
1  i
= "r(qH) for qH2 QintHi : (63)
Equation (62) is the analog to (4) and equates the ratio of the elasticities of output with respect to worker
ability and labor quantity to the elasticity of the wage schedule. Equation (63) has a similar interpretation
regarding a rms choice of manager type.
In equilibrium, all worker types must be employed, which means that rms in some sector (or both)
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must demand the full range of workers. Equation (62) can be satised for a range of workers only if the
wage schedule has a constant elasticity over this range. Therefore, the equilibrium wage schedule must take
the form
w (qL)= wiq
i=i
L for qL2 QintLi : (64)
The salary schedule for managers must have a similar form, namely
r (qH)= riq
i=(1 i)
H for qH2 QintHi , (65)
where ri is a salary anchoranalogous to wi.
When the wage function has a constant elasticity equal to i=i for a range of worker types, a rm in
sector i is indi¤erent as to its choice of employees among workers in this range, irrespective of the ability of its
manager. And when the salary function has an elasticity equal to i= (1  i), the rm is indi¤erent to the
ability of its managers. Accordingly, the matching of workers and managers among those that sort to sector
i is indeterminate in the Cobb-Douglas case. This indeterminacy reects the fact that the productivity
function in (58) is only weakly log supermodular and thus provides no clear incentives for positive (or
negative) assortative matching.
Although the matching of workers and managers in a sector is not determined in the Cobb-Douglas case,
the sorting of these factors to the two sectors follows a familiar pattern. The elasticity of the wage schedule
must be greater along its upper segment than along its lower segment, or else rms that hire the less able
workers would all prefer to upgrade their employees. Similarly, the elasticity of the salary schedule must
be greater along its upper segment than its lower segment. We designate as sector 1 whichever industry
has the greater ratio of the output elasticity with respect to worker ability to the output elasticity with
respect to labor quantity. With this labeling convention, sL= 1=1 2=2> 0. Then, in any equilibrium
in which a country produces both goods, sector 1 attracts the workers with ability qL above some cuto¤ qL.
If sH= 1= (1  1) 2= (1  2)> 0, then sector 1 also attracts the more able managers with qH> qH ;
otherwise, the sorting of managers is opposite to that for workers.
For precision, we state more formally the environment we consider throughout this appendix and the
sorting pattern that results.41
Assumption 3 (i) SH = [qHmin; qHmax], 0 < qHmin < qHmax < +1; (ii)  i (qH ; qL) = qiH qiL ,
i; i > 0, for i = 1; 2; and (iii) sL  1=1   2=2 > 0.
Proposition 10 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Then, in any competitive equilibrium with employment
in both sectors, the more able workers with qL  qL are employed in sector 1 and the less able workers with
qL  qL are employed in sector 2, for some qL 2 SL. If sH > 0 (sH < 0), the more able managers with
qH  qH are employed in sector 1 (sector 2) and the less able managers with qH  qH are employed in
sector 2 (sector 1), for some qH 2 SH .
To describe the equilibrium once the sorting pattern has been settled, we invoke factor-market clearing,
continuity of worker wages, continuity of managerial salaries, and the zero-prot conditions. For concreteness,
41Proofs of all Propositions stated in this appendix are provided at the end.
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let us focus on the case in which sH> 0 so that the more able managers sort to industry 1; the opposite
case can be handled similarly.
It proves convenient to dene eHi (qH)= q
i=(1 i)
H as the e¤ective managerial input of a manager with
ability qH who works in sector i. Then the aggregate supplies of e¤ective managerial input in sectors 1 and
2 are
H1= H
Z qHmax
qH
q
1
1 1
H H (qH) dqH ; (66)
and
H2= H
Z qH
qHmin
q
2
1 2
H H (qH) dqH , (67)
respectively. Note that H1= H depends only on qH and is a monotonically decreasing function, and H2= H
also depends only on qH and is monotonically increasing.
Consider now the supply and demand for e¤ective labor in sector 1, where we dene eLi (qL)= q
i=i
L
as the e¤ective labor provided by a worker of ability qL in sector i. From the labor demand equation (59), a
rm in sector 1 combines a manager with eHi units of e¤ective managerial input with eHi (ipi=wi)
1=(1 i)
units of e¤ective labor. Therefore, the H1 units of e¤ective managerial input that are hired into sector 1 are
combined with H1 (1p1=w1)
1=(1 1) units of e¤ective labor. Noting the denition of H1 and equating the
demand for e¤ective labor in sector 1 with the supply of e¤ective labor among those with ability above qL,
we have
H

1p1
w1
 1
1 1
Z qHmax
qH
q
1
1 1
H H (qH) dqH=
L
Z qLmax
qL
q
1
1
L LdqL . (68)
A similar condition applies in sector 2, where labor-market clearing requires
H

2p2
w2
 1
1 2
Z qH
qHmin
q
2
1 2
H H (qH) dqH=
L
Z qL
qLmin
q
2
2
L LdqL . (69)
Continuity of the wage schedule at qL requires that
w1 (q

L)
1
1 = w2 (q

L)
2
2 . (70)
The salary function for managers must also be continuous and rms that hire managers with ability qH must
earn zero prots in either sector. Together, these considerations imply
1p
1
1 1
1 w
  1
1 1
1 (q

H)
1
1 1 = 2p
1
1 2
2 w
  2
1 2
2 (q

H)
2
1 2 . (71)
Equations (68)-(71) comprise four equations that can be used to solve for the two wage anchors, w1 and
w2, and the two cuto¤s, qL and q

H . The e¤ective supply of managers in sectors 1 and 2, H1 and H2, can
then be solved from (66) and (67). Finally, the salary anchors for the managers can be computed from the
zero-prot conditions, which imply
ri= ip
1
1 i
i w
  i
1 i
i for i = 1; 2: (72)
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This completes our characterization of the supply-side equilibrium for an economy that faces prices p1 and
p2.
Pattern of Trade
As in Section 3, we need an expression for an economys relative outputs in order to conduct the com-
parative static analysis that reveals the pattern of trade between countries that di¤er in their relative factor
endowments or in their distributions of factor types. The Hi units of e¤ective managers employed in sector
i collectively produce Xi= H i (ipi)
i=(1 i)w i=(1 i)i units of good i. Each e¤ective unit of managerial
input is paid a salary of ri in sector i and by continuity of the salary function r1=r2=(q

H)
 sH (see (65)).
Using this condition together with (68)-(69) and (71)-(72), we can write
X1
X2
=
r1H1
r2H2
(1  2) p2
(1  1) p1
=
(1  2) p2
R qHmax
qH
q
1
1 1
H H (qH) dqH
(1  1) p1
R qH
qHmin
q
2
1 2
H H (qH) dqH
(qH)
 sH : (73)
Similar to the case of homogeneous managers, the rst equality reects the fact that the aggregate salaries
of all managers in sector i absorb a fraction 1  i of revenue. And the second equality implies that, since
sH > 0 in the case under consideration, X1=X2 is a decreasing function of q

H . Therefore, to identify
the pattern of trade, we need only nd which country allocates more e¤ective managerial input to sector 1
relative to its aggregate endowment of managers; that is, how qH varies with factor endowments.42
The system of equations (68)-(71) that applies with Cobb-Douglas productivity is quite similar to the
system (6)-(9) that applies when managers are homogeneous, except that now we need to use the e¤ective
managerial input in a sector in place of the pure number of managers. In other words, the multiplicative
separability of the productivity function allows us to construct an aggregate measure of managerial input
that plays the same role as does the number of managers when managers are equally productive. We can
do so, because there are no forces present in the Cobb-Douglas case to induce any particular pattern of
matching within either sector. The following propositions assert that the determinants of the trade pattern
in an economy with heterogeneous managers but Cobb-Douglas productivity mirror those that we described
for an economy with homogeneous managers.
Proposition 11 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds. Then if AL(qL) = 
B
L (qL) for all qL2 SAL= SBL ,
AH(qH) = 
B
H (qH) for all qH2 SAH= SBH , and HA=LA> HB=LB, country A exports the manager-intensive
good.
Proposition 12 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and HA=LA= HB=LB. Then, (i) if AH(qH) = 
B
H (qH)
for all qH2 SAH= SBH and AL (qL) is a rightward shift of BL (qL) for some  > 1, then country A exports
good 1 if and only if 1> 2; (ii) if 
A
L(qL) = 
B
L (qL) for all qL2 SAL= SBL and AH(qH) is a rightward
shift of BH (qH) for some  > 1, then country A exports good 1 if and only if 1> 2.
In short, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem applies when countries have similar distributions of factor types but
di¤er in their relative aggregate endowments of managers versus workers. Alternatively, if the relative factor
42Note that in the opposite case, when sH < 0, managers with qH  qH sort into sector 2 while managers with
qH  qH sort into sector 1. As a result, X1=X2 is an increasing function of qH .
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endowments are the same in the two countries but they di¤er in their distributions of one of the factors, then
the country with the rightward-shifted distribution of a factor exports the good produced by the industry in
which productivity responds more elastically to that factors ability.
E¤ects of Trade on Income Distribution
Our results on income distribution also carry over straightforwardly from the case with homogeneous
managers to that with manager heterogeneity but Cobb-Douglas productivity. First note that within-
industry income distribution is not a¤ected by world trade inasmuch as the elasticity of the wage schedule for
workers employed in a given industry is constant. As a result, (64) implies thatw (q0L) =w (q
00
L)= (q
0
L=q
00
L)
i=i
for q0L; q
00
L2 QLi and (65) implies that r (q0H) =r (q00H)= (q0H=q00H)i=(1 i) for q0H ; q00H2 QHi. Second, rel-
ative rewards of workers and managers that are employed in di¤erent industries do change with trade,
inasmuch as the wage and salary anchors wi and ri change. Our next proposition is
Proposition 13 Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and sH  0. When p^1 > 0, (i) w^1 > w^2; (ii) if 1 
2, then w^1 > p^1 > r^1  r^2 > 0 > w^2; (iii) if 1 > 2 and sL  0, then w^1  w^2 > p^1 > 0 > r^1  r^2;
(iv) if 1 < 2 and sL  0, then r^1  r^2 > p^1 > 0 > w^1  w^2.
Proposition 13 can be understood by recognizing that the model with heterogeneous workers and man-
agers also contains a blend of Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner forces. When sH 0, there is no
di¤erence in the suitability of the various managers for employment in one sector versus the other, because
the comparative advantage associated with greater ability of the input just o¤sets the comparative advan-
tage associated with greater quantity. Then, it is as if managers are a perfectly mobile, homogeneous factor.
When sL also is small, the Stolper-Samuelson forces will dominate, and workers in both industries will see
a gain in real income if the relative price of the labor-intensive good rises and will see a loss in real income
if the relative price of the labor-intensive good falls. In contrast, if factor intensities are approximately the
same in the two industries, the Stolper-Samuelson forces will be muted, and the partial specicity of workers
arising from the comparative advantage of ability in sector 1 will govern the income responses. Then, workers
will benet in real terms when the relative price of the good they produce rises and will lose in real terms
if the relative price of this good falls. Also note that similar considerations imply that if sH> 0 but sL 0
and 1 2, the economy behaves like one with sector-specic managers and perfectly mobile labor. Then
r^1> p^1> w^1 w^2> 0 > r^2, i.e., managers in the expanding sector gain, managers in the contracting sector
lose, and workers may gain or lose in real terms depending on their consumption pattern. Finally, similarly
to Proposition 4, an increase in the price of good 1 raises overall wage inequality, because it does not change
relative wages within sectors and it increases wages of the more able, better-paid workers employed in sector
1 relative to the less able, lower-paid workers in sector 2.
Proofs
First note that, in the system comprising (68)-(71), a proportional increase in the number of managers
and workers has no e¤ect on the wage anchors w1 and w2 or on the ability cuto¤s qL and q

H . Therefore, it
does not change the output ratio X1=X2 (see (73)). It follows that if countries A and B di¤er only in size,
with H and L being proportionately larger in one of the countries, they will have the same relative demand
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for the two goods and the same relative supply and they will not trade with one another. Accordingly, we
can nd the impact of H=L on the pattern of trade by analyzing the impact of L on qH , which will tell us
how the relative supply X1=X2 is a¤ected.
Di¤erentiating the equilibrium system (68)-(71), we obtain0BBBB@
1  1 sL 0
  11 1
2
1 2 0 sH
0 E21 2 2  2
E1
1 1 0  1 1
1CCCCA
0BBB@
w^1
w^2
q^L
q^H
1CCCA =
0BBB@
0
0
 E2
 E1
1CCCA bL+
0BBBB@
0
  11 1
0
E1
1 1
1CCCCA p^1;
where Ei is e¤ective labor in sector i, dened as
E1 = H

1p1
w1
 1
1 1
Z qHmax
qH
q
1
1 1
H H (qH) dqH ;
E2 = H

2p2
w2
 1
1 2
Z qH
qHmin
q
2
1 2
H H (qH) dqH ;
and
1 = L (q

L)
1
1
+1
L (q

L) ;
2 = L (q

L)
2
2
+1
L (q

L) ;
1 = H

1p1
w1
 1
1 1
(qH)
1
1 1+1 H (q

H) ;
2 = H

2p2
w2
 1
1 2
(qH)
2
1 2+1 H (q

H) :
The determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side of this system, DCD, satises
(1  2) (1  1) ( DCD) = (12  21) (1   2) + sH [1E2 (1  1) + 2E1 (1  2)]
+sL (11E2 +22E1) + E1E2sHsL:
Using the equilibrium conditions (70) and (71), we nd that
(12  21) (1   2) = 21
(1   2)2
2 (1  1)
> 0:
Therefore DCD < 0. We also compute
q^HDCD = (1E2 + 2E1 + E1E2sL)
1   2
(1  1) (1  2)
bL:
Since DCD < 0, an increase in L reduces qH if and only if 1 > 2. So, the output of good 1 rises relative
to that of good 2 if and only if sector 2 is more labor intensive than sector 1. This proves Proposition 11.
24
Next, we calculate the impact of p1 on the wage anchors:
w^1 (1  2) (1  1) ( DCD) = (12  21 + 2E1sH) (1  2) p^1
+ [(1E2 +22E1) sL + E1E2sHsL] p^1;
w^2 (1  1) ( DCD) = (12  21 + 2E1sH  2E1sL) p^1:
Therefore,
(w^1   w^2) (1  1) ( DCD) = [(1E2 +22E1) sL + E1E2sHsL +2E1sL (1  2)] p^1.
Since DCD < 0, it follows that an increase in the price of good 1 results in w^1 > w^2, which proves part (i)
of Proposition 13.
Next consider the case in which sH  0 and 1  2. In this case,
(1  2) (1  1) ( DCD)  sL (11E2 +22E1) :
Then
w^1  w^2  1E2 +22E1
11E2 +22E1
p^1;
because 1  2 implies 12 21  0. Evidently, in this case, w^1 > p^1 > 0 > w^2. To complete the proof
of part (ii) of Proposition 13, we need to calculate the response of the anchors r1 and r2 for the managers
salaries. When p1 rises, (72) yields r^1 = (1  1) 1 p^1   1 (1  1) 1 w^1 and r^2 =  2 (1  2) 1 w^2. In
case (ii) of Proposition 13, with sH  0 and 1  2, these imply
r^1  r^2  22E1
11E2 +22E1
p^1:
It follows that p^1 > r^1  r^2 > 0. So, part (ii) of the proposition is proved.
We turn now to parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 13. The antecedents sH  0 and sL  0 imply
(1  2) (1  1) ( DCD)  (12  21) (1   2) ;
w^1 (1  1) ( DCD)  (12  21) p^1;
w^2 (1  1) ( DCD)  (12  21) p^1:
It follows that
w^1  w^2  1  2
1   2
p^1;
which implies that w^1  w^2 > p^1 > 0 for 1 > 2 and w^1  w^2 < 0 < p^1 for 1 < 2. Moreover, since
r^1 = (1  1) 1 p^1   1 (1  1) 1 w^1 and r^2 =  2 (1  2) 1 w^2, we have
r^1  r^2    2
1   2
p^1:
Evidently, in this case, r^1  r^2 < 0 < p^1 when 1 > 2 and r^1  r^2 > p^1 > 0 when 1 < 2. This completes
the proof of Proposition 13.
We next consider the impact of a rightward shift of the density function  (qL) ; as dened in (12).
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To perform these comparative statics, we follow the procedure from the previous section; that is, we hold
the distribution of types constant but endow a worker of type qL with qL units of ability, and we dene
QL = q

L. Di¤erentiating the equilibrium system (68)-(71), we now obtain0BBBB@
1  1 sL 0
  11 1
2
1 2 0 sH
0 E21 2 2  2
E1
1 1 0  1 1
1CCCCA
0BBB@
w^1
w^2
Q^L
q^H
1CCCA =
0BBBB@
0
0
 22E2 + 2
 11E1   1
1CCCCAb:
Using (??), it follows that for sH> 0 an increase in  raises the relative output of good 1 if it reduces qH .
However, from the above system of equations we obtain:
q^H (1  2) (1  1) ( DCD)=   (1E2+2E1+sLE1E2) (1 2) ^:
Therefore a rightward shift of the density function  (qL) raises the relative output of good 1 if and only if
1 > 2. This proves the rst part of Proposition 12. The second part is proved similarly.
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